旅游利益相关者低碳环境责任行为及相互影响研究——基于动态演化博弈的分析  

Research on low-carbon environmental responsibility behavior and mutual influence of tourism stakeholders——An analysis based on dynamic evolutionary game theory

作　　者：杨阿莉[1] 陈新如 辜友骞 赵丽珠 YANG A-li;CHEN Xin-ru;GU You-qian;ZHAO Li-zhu(College of Tourism,Northwest Normal University,Lanzhou 730070,Gansu,China)

机构地区：[1]西北师范大学旅游学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《西北师范大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第5期68-78,共11页Journal of Northwest Normal University(Natural Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(19BGL193);甘肃省哲学社会科学规划项目(2021QN008)。

摘　　要：旅游管理主体、服务供给主体、旅游消费主体作为旅游业最核心的利益相关者,在旅游目的地环境保护与碳减排进程中具有十分重要的责任和义务.旅游利益相关者间的低碳环境责任行为存在利益冲突,各主体低碳环境责任行为相互影响、相互制约.以周庄低碳旅游示范区为例,通过分析旅游利益相关者低碳环境责任行为,构建三方演化博弈模型,对博弈系统均衡点进行稳定性分析与仿真分析.研究表明:三方主体策略选择相互影响,不同利益相关者的低碳环境责任行为策略选择都将影响博弈系统的演化趋势;不同约束条件下,演化博弈系统存在四种不同的演化稳定策略组合,其中旅游管理主体做好低碳宣传、服务供给主体积极减排降碳、旅游消费主体积极参与低碳旅游是最理想的演化稳定状态.研究结果可为旅游业低碳化发展目标下各利益相关者的合作共赢管理提供理论参考.The tourism management main body,service supply main body and tourism consumption main body,as the most core stakeholders of the tourism industry,have very important responsibilities and obligations in the process of environmental protection and carbon emission reduction in tourism destinations.Nevertheless,low-carbon environmental responsibility behavior of tourism stakeholders has conflict of interest,and the low-carbon environmental responsibility behavior of each subject influences and constrains each other.Based on the example of Zhouzhuang low-carbon tourism demonstration area,a three-party evolutionary game model was constructed by analyzing the low-carbon environmental responsibility behaviors of tourism stakeholders,stability analysis and simulation analysis on the equilibrium point of the game system was carried out.The study indicates that the strategy choices of the three parties influence each other,and the strategy choices of the low-carbon environmental responsibility behaviors of different stakeholders will affect the evolution trend of the game system.There exist four different combinations of evolutionary stability strategies in the evolutionary game system under different constraints.The optimal evolutionary stable state is that the tourism management body will do a good job in low-carbon publicity,the service supply body will actively reduce emissions and carbon,and the tourism consumption body will actively participate in low-carbon tourism.The objective of this study is to contribute to the cooperation and win-win situation of all stakeholders under the goal of low-carbon tourism development,and to provide theoretical reference.

关 键 词：低碳旅游 利益相关者 环境责任行为 演化博弈 仿真分析 

分 类 号：F592.3[经济管理—旅游管理]