近代金融机构制度变迁中的股权激励演进  

Evolution Analysis of Equity Incentives in the Institutional Changes of Modern Financial Institutions

作　　者：曾江 周建波[2] ZENG Jiang;ZHOU Jian-bo

机构地区：[1]中国政法大学商学院,北京100088 [2]北京大学经济学院,北京100871

出　　处：《湖北大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第5期55-68,178,共15页Journal of Hubei University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“财政-金融结合视角的近代中国金融业态演进研究”(22BJL007);国家社会科学基金重大项目“东亚同文书院经济调查资料的整理与研究”(20&ZD066)。

摘　　要：中国传统合伙企业的顶身股制是一种股权激励机制的早期形态。这一制度在票号业中发挥了充分的激励作用。票号顶身股制具有激励范围较广、激励力度较强,但会在一定程度上稀释银股收益的特征。这使得身股和银股股东之间存在权责利不对称的问题。造成这一状况的主要原因在于顶身股制来源于传统手工业与商业,应用于资本密集、高风险的金融业有其局限性。因此,在金融业走向近代股份企业的过程中,为适应社会化筹资需求,新的股权激励形式开始出现。近代银行一方面使用参与盈余分配的酬劳金给予员工收益激励,另一方面试图推行全员持股,使员工拥有完整股东权益,此外还利用储金制度对员工行为加以约束,推动权责利进一步平衡。The personal share mechanism of Chinese traditional partnership contains the early form of equity-based incentive mechanism,which has played a full incentive role in Shanxi Banking(Piaohao).The stock system could motivate a significant proportion of employees to work enthusiastically,but meanwhile diluted the earnings of shareholders who made capital contributions.This leads to the problem of asymmetrical rights,responsibilities and interests between different types of shareholders.The main reason for this situation is that the stock system comes from the traditional handicraft industry and commerce,and its application to the capital-intensive and high-risk financial industry has its limitations.Therefore,in the financial industry moving towards modern joint-stock enterprises,new equity-based incentive forms began to emerge in order to meet the needs of socialized financing.Modern banks use the remuneration for participating in the distribution of earnings to give employees income incentives.On the other hand,they try to implement full shareholding,so that employees have complete shareholders rights and interests.They also use the savings system to restrict employees behaviors and promote the further balance of rights,responsibilities and interests.

关 键 词：股权激励 顶身股 合伙制 酬劳金 员工持股 

分 类 号：F129[经济管理—世界经济] F092