过度自信下直播电商信用监管的随机演化分析  

Analysis of the stochastic evolution of live streaming e-commerce credit supervision under overconfidence

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作  者:危小超[1] 佘其平 聂规划[1] Wei Xiaochao;She Qiping;Nie Guihua(School of Economics,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan 430070,China)

机构地区:[1]武汉理工大学经济学院,湖北武汉430070

出  处:《系统工程学报》2024年第4期552-569,共18页Journal of Systems Engineering

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(72271192,71971093);教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(22YJC630152);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(WUT:2019IVA093)。

摘  要:考虑过度自信和随机扰动对直播电商信用监管决策的影响,引入过度自信刻画主体行为特征,构建直播电商平台、直播商家、消费者三方参与的演化博弈模型,设计无过度自信、单一主体过度自信和多主体过度自信三类过度自信场景.进而,引入白噪声和It?随机微分方程建立随机动力系统.分析各要素对博弈策略演化的影响.研究发现,直播电商平台的过度自信对其积极监管策略选择有正向影响,商家和消费者的过度自信对其自律策略选择和监督策略选择有负向影响.随机扰动对平台、商家和消费者的策略选择均有负向影响,扰动强度越大,波动幅度越大,收敛速度越慢,且无过度自信场景下更显著.从影响商家自律策略选择的演化速度和变化程度来看,声誉机制调控优先级更高;其次,存在商家过度自信的场景下,增加对商家的失信惩罚效果更明显,反之,降低监管成本影响更显著.This paper studies the credit supervision mechanism of live streaming e-commerce by constructing an evolutionary game model involving live streaming e-commerce platform,platform sellers,and consumers.Considering the influence of overconfidence and random disturbance on the decision-making process,this study employs overconfidence to characterize the behaviors of the three players.Additionally,the Gaussian White noise and an Ito stochastic differential equation are introduced to develop a dynamical equation.Numerical results show that the overconfidence of the platform has a positive impact on its active regulation strategy selec-tion,and the overconfidence of sellers and consumers has a negative impact on their non-violation strategy and supervision strategy selection.Random disturbance has a negative impact on players'strategy selection.The greater the disturbance intensity,the greater the fluctuation,the slower the convergence speed,and the effect is more pronounced in non-overconfidence scenario.Besides,from the perspective of regulation and control on sellers'strategy convergence speed and changing degree,the regulatory effect of reputation mechanism is more pronounced and has a higher priority;secondly,when there is seller overconfidence,increasing the penalty for sellers is more effective;conversely,reducing the cost of credit supervision works better.

关 键 词:直播电商 信用监管 过度自信 随机演化博弈 

分 类 号:TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]

 

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