包容的悖论:族群权力分享与发展中国家国内冲突  

The Paradox of Inclusion:Ethnic Power Sharing and Civil Conflict in Developing Countries

作　　者：李祉球 Li Zhiqiu(School of Government,Peking University)

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871

出　　处：《世界经济与政治》2024年第9期31-62,161,共33页World Economics and Politics

摘　　要：将不同族群纳入行政决策过程的权力分享制度实践是现代多族群国家缓和冲突的普遍选择。但从理论和经验上看,族群权力分享给一些国家带来和平的同时却致使另一些国家陷入政治动荡。之所以出现这一现象,原因可能在于就政治经济现代化进程较为滞后的发展中国家而言,族群权力分享带来了庇护网络扩大化问题,不同族群对于公共产品的需求增加;而一国自然资源收入的高低将影响到政治精英是否具备足够的租金提供相应的公共产品,因此族群权力分享对于国内冲突的影响将受自然资源收入的调节作用。如果一国既经由族群权力分享扩展庇护网络,又具备相应的自然资源收入建设包容性庇护网络,那么该国国内冲突才能得到缓解。通过量化研究检验发展中国家自然资源收入对于族群权力分享与国内冲突关系的调节作用,结合对加纳、尼日利亚、肯尼亚和津巴布韦四国的比较案例分析,可以管窥族群权力分享与自然资源收入对于国内冲突产生影响的因果过程。Power-sharing systems that involve various ethnic groups in the executive decision-making process are often used to mitigate conflict in multi-ethnic countries.However,these systems have produced mixed results.While they have brought peace to some nations,they have led to political instability in others.This variation may stem from the challenges faced by developing countries,where political and economic modernization is lagging behind.In such contexts,ethnic power-sharing can expand patronage networks and increase demand for public goods from different ethnic groups.Political elites'ability to meet these demands often depends on the availability of natural resource revenues.Thus,the impact of ethnic power-sharing on civil conflict is moderated by natural resource revenues.A country can only mitigate civil conflict if it has both the capacity to expand its patronage network through ethnic power-sharing and sufficient natural resource revenues to support this network.Quantitative research,combined with comparative case studies of Ghana,Nigeria,Kenya,and Zimbabwe,provides insights into the causal process by which ethnic powersharing and natural resource revenues affect civil conflict.

关 键 词：族群权力分享 国内冲突 自然资源收入 庇护网络 非正式制度 

分 类 号：D815.5[政治法律—国际关系]