基于系统动力学的充电基础设施利益相关者行为的演化博弈分析  

An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Stakeholders’Behavior in Charging Infrastructure Based on System Dynamics

作　　者：王伟 张靖轩 邵志国 汤洪霞 WANG Wei;ZHANG Jing-xuan;SHAO Zhi-guo;TANG Hong-xia(School of Management Engineering,Qingdao University of Technology,Qingdao 266520,China;Sustainable Development and New-type Urbanization Think-tank,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China)

机构地区：[1]青岛理工大学管理工程学院,山东青岛266520 [2]同济大学可持续发展与新型城镇化智库,上海200092

出　　处：《系统科学学报》2024年第3期64-71,共8页Chinese Journal of Systems Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目“中国关键基础设施系统生态演化机理与韧性提升策略”(71874123);“供需视角下中国城市邻避困境形成机理与整体性治理研究”(71704162);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目“含双向充电桩的新能源微电网运行机制建模及优化策略”(71871160);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目“基于整体性治理的中国邻避设施供给模式重构”(17YJC630184)。

摘　　要：针对我国充电基础设施发展供需失衡日益加剧的现象,本文基于利益相关者视角,构建充电基础设施多主体行为的演化博弈模型,结合系统动力学仿真模拟,研究政府、运营商和消费者的演化稳定状态及各参数变量对主体策略行为选择的影响。仿真结果表明,整个系统趋向于稳定状态的关键在于运营商的策略选择,运营商积极运营是消费者购买电动汽车的前提;建设运营补贴力度、政府监管成本和惩罚力度等因素是系统向稳定状态演化的主要驱动力。最后提出建议:政府应制定合理的补贴制度,完善监管制度,建立有效的惩罚机制,减缓对消费者购车补贴的退坡速度;运营商应与电网公司等寻求长期合作,拓宽盈利渠道,创新经营模式。研究成果可助力我国充电基础设施的快速发展。Charging infrastructure development imbalance between supply and demand is rising in China.Based on the perspective of stakeholders,the multi-agent evolutionary game model of charging infrastructure is established,and numerical simulation for system dynamics is carried out to study the evolutionary stability strategy of the government,the operators and consumers,and the parameter variable's influence on the strategy of subject choice.The simulation results show that the active operation of operators is the prerequisite for consumers to buy electric cars and the key to the stable state of the whole system lies in the operator's choice of strategy;the key factors to promote the evolution of the system to a stable equilibrium state are the intensity of construction operation subsidies,the cost of government supervision and the severity of punishment to operators.Based on the simulation results and from the perspective of supply side,this paper proposes that the government should formulate a reasonable subsidy system for infrastructure construction and operation,improve the supervision mechanism,establish an effective punishment mechanism,and slow down the regression speed of subsidies;operators should seek long-term cooperation with power grid companies to broaden profit channels and innovate business models.The research results can contribute to the rapid development of China's charging infrastructure.

关 键 词：充电基础设施 利益相关者 系统动力学 演化博弈 

分 类 号：N949[自然科学总论—系统科学] F294.9[经济管理—国民经济]