基于柔性契约的应急物资政企联合储备定价博弈模型  

Game model of government-enterprise joint reserve pricing of emergency materials based on flexible contract

作　　者：王喆[1,2] 单红颜 陶梦琪 罗梦柯 WANG Zhe;SHAN Hongyan;TAO Mengqi;LUO Mengke(School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China;China Research Center for Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China)

机构地区：[1]武汉理工大学安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北武汉430070 [2]武汉理工大学中国应急管理研究中心,湖北武汉430070

出　　处：《中国安全生产科学技术》2024年第9期20-28,共9页Journal of Safety Science and Technology

基　　金：教育部人文社科基金青年项目(20YJC630154);中央高校基本科研业务费专项项目(104972024DZB0003)。

摘　　要：为提高突发事件应急物资保障能力与韧性、控制政府采购成本,构建基于柔性契约的应急物资政企联合储备定价博弈模型。以政府采购成本最小化、供应商利润最大化为目标,运用逆向归纳法依次求解供应商最优实物、原材料储备量决策和政府最优定价决策,并进行数值模拟仿真验证及变量敏感性分析。研究结果表明:与政府单独储备模式相比,该模型能够提升应急物资储备水平,提高政府应对突发事件的能力,同时降低政府采购成本并提高供应商收益,实现政企双方共赢。高灾害概率促使政府增加储备、企业调整生产,政府大规模的常规采购会给企业带来稳定收益,企业在现货市场供给率较大时会提高原材料储备量。灾害发生概率、现货市场采购价格、政府常规采购量、现货市场供给率等因素对政企双方决策及成本收益均有影响。研究结果可为政企双方应急物资储备量、采购价格以及激励双方合作储备提供决策参考。In order to improve the support ability and resilience of emergency materials and control the cost of government procurement,a game model of the government-enterprise joint reserve pricing of emergency materials based on flexible contract was constructed.Aiming at minimizing the cost of government procurement and maximizing the profit of suppliers,the backward induction method was used to solve the suppliers’decision-making on the optimal physical reserve quantity and raw material reserve quantity and the government’s decision-making on the optimal pricing in turn,and the numerical simulation verification and sensitivity analysis of variables were conducted.The results show that compared with the government’s sole reserve mode,this model can improve the level of emergency materials reserve,improve the ability of government to cope with emergencies,reduce the cost of government procurement and improve the income of suppliers,and achieve a win-win situation for both government and enterprises.The high disaster probability prompts the government to increase reserve and enterprises to adjust production.The large-scale conventional procurement by the government will bring stable benefits to enterprises,and the enterprises will increase the quantity of raw material reserve when the supply rate of spot market is large,that is,the probability of disaster occurrence,the purchase price of spot market,the quantity of conventional procurement by the government,the supply rate of spot market and other factors influence the decision-making and cost-benefit of both government and enterprises.The research results can provide reference for the government and enterprises to make decisions on emergency materials reserve quantity,purchase price and incentive enterprises to cooperate in reserve.

关 键 词：应急物资储备 STACKELBERG博弈 采购定价 数量柔性契约 

分 类 号：X915.4[环境科学与工程—安全科学] F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]