精神隐私可以成为新兴权利吗?  

Can Mental Privacy Become an Emerging Right?

作　　者：陈鲁夏 Chen Luxia

机构地区：[1]北京中医药大学人文学院法律系

出　　处：《环球法律评论》2024年第5期89-104,共16页Global Law Review

基　　金：2023年度中国博士后科学基金面上项目(第74批)“神经权利实质及其法理框架研究”(E31ZK61131)的研究成果。

摘　　要：新兴权利识别框架包含实质正当性、承载可能性、法体系协调性三方面要素。以马塞洛·伊恩卡和罗伯特·安多诺为代表的精神隐私权新兴权利论无法得到有效辩护。传统隐私权和精神隐私权都旨在保护个人与尊严和自由相关的隐私感受。引入新的精神隐私权会造成隐私保护上的身心二元论,并对传统隐私权造成不合理限制。既有个人数据保护权已有关于敏感数据的规定,大脑数据并不比这些数据更具隐私敏感性。引入新的精神隐私权无助于在无意识大脑信息解码的情况下恢复个人对自身信息的自主和控制。神经活动并不是精神隐私利益的合理载体,无需为了保护作为大脑数据来源的神经活动引入更宽泛的隐私权。总体上,神经技术情境并没有带来新的值得保护的利益类型,精神隐私的相关权利主张与既有权利分享着相同的权利根据。将精神隐私主张纳入既有权利的保护范围不会造成保护不足或不合理,故而证立精神隐私为新兴权利是不必要之举。To address the privacy challenges posed by neurotechnology,it is necessary to consider whether to introduce new rights or adapt established rights.Focusing on the right to mental privacy proposed by Marcello Ienca and Roberto Andorno,this paper develops a framework to assess the need to introduce emerging rights,which unfolds in three steps:(i)confirm the substantial legitimacy of new claims to determine if they warrant legal protection;(ii)evaluate whether incorporating new claims into existing rights would lead to inadequate protection,thus necessitating a new right;and(iii)ensure that introducing a new right does not unduly restrict existing rights,so as to preserve legal coherence.First,decoding mental states poses unique challenges to one's mental privacy.An individual's inner life and personality traits are of substantive value to be protected by law.However,the right to mental privacy and the traditional privacy right share the same basis,both protecting people's feelings of privacy related to dignity and freedom.The neurotechnological scenario does not introduce new interest claims that warrant distinct legal protection beyond the existing privacy framework.Including mental privacy in the established right to privacy offers sufficient protection,thus eliminating the need for it to stand alone.Establishing a separate right could result in a mind-body dichotomy in the legal protection of privacy.Furthermore,the special nature of brain data does not exceed the protective scope and strength of the existing data protection right.The application of the provisions on sensitive data to the protection of brain data does not result in inadequate protection.Second,the decoding of unconscious brain data by neurotechnology challenges the premise of autonomy and informed consent in information privacy.Protecting unconscious brain data and the individual's ability to consciously control the flow of personal information is important.However,introducing a separate right to mental privacy merely reaffirms the autonomy prin

关 键 词：精神隐私权 新兴权利 大脑数据 精神状态信息 

分 类 号：D913[政治法律—民商法学]