地区劳动力市场晋升激励对股价崩盘风险的影响研究  

Study on the influence of promotion incentives in regional labor market on stock price crash risk

作　　者：胡增芳[1] Hu Zengfang(School of Financial Science and Technology,Anhui Business College,Wuhu Anhui 241002)

机构地区：[1]安徽商贸职业技术学院金融科技学院,安徽芜湖241002

出　　处：《安徽商贸职业技术学院学报》2024年第3期41-47,共7页Journal of Anhui Business College

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目(AHSKQ2022D047)。

摘　　要：在地区劳动力市场竞争所引发的锦标赛效应的驱动之下,公司CEO可能为了提升其在地区劳动力市场晋升的机会,而故意掩饰公司的坏消息,进而可能会提高公司股价崩盘风险。运用2006—2022年中国上市公司数据,考察了地区劳动力市场的晋升激励与公司股价崩盘风险之间的关系,研究结果表明,地区劳动力市场的晋升激励对公司股价崩盘风险产生显著的正向影响。研究为高管地区劳动力市场晋升激励影响公司股价崩盘风险提供了经验证据,并为维护资本市场稳定提供重要的启示。Driven by the tournament effect caused by regional labor market competition,the CEO of a company may deliberately cover up the bad news of the company in order to improve his chances of promotion in the regional labor market,which may increase the risk of the company's stock price crash.Based on the data of listed companies in China from 2006 to 2022,this paper examines the relationship between promotion incentives in regional labor market and stock price crash risk.The results show that promotion incentives in regional labor market have a significant positive impact on stock price crash risk.This study provides empirical evidence for the influence of regional labor market promotion incentives on the stock price crash risk of the company,and provides important implications for maintaining the stability of the capital market.

关 键 词：地区劳动力市场晋升激励 股价崩盘风险 坏消息 

分 类 号：F249.21[经济管理—劳动经济] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]