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作 者:陆艺升 罗荣华[2] 朱菲菲 LU Yisheng;LUO Ronghua;ZHU Feifei(School of Finance,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics;Institute of Chinese Financial Studies,Southwestern University of Finance and Economics;School of Finance,Central University of Finance and Economics)
机构地区:[1]西南财经大学金融学院,611130 [2]西南财经大学中国金融研究院,611130 [3]中央财经大学金融学院,100026
出 处:《经济研究》2024年第7期111-129,共19页Economic Research Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(72373119);国家自然科学基金青年项目(72102247);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(22JJD790022);中央财经大学重大研究支持计划“金融可持续发展研究”的资助。
摘 要:机构投资者在深化我国金融领域改革过程中发挥着重要作用,而既有文献对其能否在不同情境下进行相机抉择从而发挥公司治理效应却鲜有探讨。借助我国A股市场上广泛存在的上市公司控股股东股权质押这一场景,本文发现,在当前控股股东股权质押对公司经营的影响偏负面的情境下,机构投资者主要通过监督渠道和交易渠道发挥作用,总体上抑制了控股股东的股权质押。而在控股股东股权质押有利于公司经营的情境下,机构投资者通过背书效应促进控股股东的股权质押。进一步分析显示,在不同的质押场景以及不同性质的公司中,机构投资者对渠道的运用顺序和偏好存在差异。本文的研究结果对于推动股权质押市场良性发展、推进公司治理现代化、促进资本市场健康稳定发展均具有重要启示。The Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has made a forward-looking and systematic top-level design for comprehensively deepening reform of the financial system.It has set clear goals for promoting high-quality financial development and accelerating the building of a nation with a strong financial sector.As the cornerstone of the modern financial system,institutional investors play a crucial role in advancing corporate governance modernization and promoting the healthy and stable development of capital markets.However,their ability to make discretionary decisions to exert corporate governance effects has rarely been explored in the literature.This paper delves into whether and how institutional investors exert governance effects in the context of the prevalent and impactful phenomenon of controlling shareholders'share pledging in China.The unique advantage of this context lies in the fact that share pledging,as a neutral financing tool,exerts varying impacts on company operations according to the purpose of the pledged funds and the pledge ratio.Therefore,exploring whether institutional investors can correctly interpret the economic consequences of controlling shareholders'pledge decisions and make discretionary decisions to exert governance effects is of significant value for advancing corporate governance modernization and enhancing the capital market's ability to serve the real economy.Using historical data from Chinese A-share listed companies and institutional investors'holdings from 2007 to 2021,this paper finds that due to the majority of pledged funds being used by controlling shareholders themselves or other non listed entities,and the generally high pledge ratios,the impact on company operations with controlling shareholders'share pledging is predominantly negative.Consequently,institutional investors overall tend to inhibit controlling shareholders'share pledging.This result remains significant after employing difference-in-differences and instrumental var
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