面向质量和交货期的产能分享平台审核策略研究  

Research on Quality and Delivery Time Audit Strategy of Capacity Sharing Platform

作　　者：赵道致[1] 薛洋[1] 韩红帅 ZHAO Daozhi;XUE Yang;HAN Hongshuai(Tianjin University,Tianjin,China;Qilu University of Technology(Shandong Academy of Sciences),Jinan,China)

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部 [2]齐鲁工业大学(山东省科学院)经济与管理学部

出　　处：《管理学报》2024年第8期1227-1236,共10页Chinese Journal of Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(72072125);山东省人文社会科学基金资助项目(2022-YYGL-04)。

摘　　要：通过构建双边市场模型探索产能分享平台的审核策略。研究表明:当产能需求方仅对质量敏感,排除低质量产能供应方比仅根据质量对产能供应方分级更利于平台盈利;当产能需求方对质量和交货期均敏感,设置两个维度的审核门槛能使平台获得更高利润;平台利润与双边用户交叉网络外部性、产能需求方对质量的敏感性正相关,与产能需求方对交货期的敏感性负相关;质量和交货期审核门槛受产能需求方对这两个维度的敏感性、双边用户网络外部性、平台审核成本系数相互作用影响。The capacity sharing platform’s audit strategy is explored by building bilateral market models.The paper shows that:when the capacity demanders are only sensitive to quality,excluding low-quality capacity suppliers can make the platform more profitable than grading capacity suppliers based on the quality threshold,when the capacity demanders are sensitive to both quality and delivery time,the platform sets two-dimensional thresholds to help the platform obtain higher profits;the platform profit is positively correlated with the cross-network externality coefficient of bilateral users,positively correlated with the quality sensitive coefficient of capacity demanders,and negatively correlated with the delivery time sensitive coefficient of capacity demanders;the quality threshold and delivery time threshold are influenced by the interaction of these two dimensions,the cross-network externality coefficient of bilateral users,and the cost coefficient of the platform audit.

关 键 词：产能分享 平台审核 质量敏感 交货期敏感 交叉网络外部性 

分 类 号：C93[经济管理—管理学]