论知识权威的优先主义  

On Preemptionism of Epistemic Authority

作　　者：孟峰 MENG Feng(Department of Philosophy,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学哲学系,重庆401120

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2024年第8期34-40,共7页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

基　　金：国家社会科学基金青年项目“西方知识论中证言确证研究”(20CZX039)。

摘　　要：关于听者如何在知识上确证地(justified)接受权威证言,优先主义(Preemptionism)是当前最有影响的理论,即听者在认知上应完全服从权威,因为权威已为听者提供了相信它的理由,权威理由完全取代或掩盖了听者的自有理由。具体而言,首先论述优先主义的基本主张,展示其合理性;进而论述优先主义对挑战的回应,显露其局限性;最后为优先主义增加一个必要的限制或前提,即听者须对权威证言形成必要的理解。总之,权威优先主义总体是合理的,但它应有更多的前提。Preemptionism is currently the most influential theory about how listeners justified accept authoritative testimony.That is,the listener should be cognitively completely obedient to the authority,because the authority has provided reasons for the listener to believe it,the authoritative reasons complete-ly replace or conceal the listener's own reasons.Specifically,firstly,basic reasons of preemption are discussed and its rationality is demonstrated;sec-ondly,the responses of preemption to some challenges are discussed,and its limitations are revealed;finally,a necessary limitation or premise is added to the preemption,that is,the listener has some necessary understanding of authoritative testimony.In short,preemptionism is generally reasonable,but itshould havemore restrictiveconditions.

关 键 词：证言 知识权威 优先性 信任 理解 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]