分权时序对耕地保护的影响——基于地方政府财政收支的视角  

The impact of sequence of decentralization on cropland protection:An analysis from the perspective of local government fiscal revenue and expenditure

作　　者：杨巨声 兰雨潇 闫茹 YANG Jusheng;LAN Yuxiao;YAN Ru(School of Government,Peking University,Beijing 100871,China;School of Public Policy and Management,Tsinghua University,Beijing 100084,China;China Academy for Rural Development,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310030,China;School of Public Affairs,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou 310030,China)

机构地区：[1]北京大学政府管理学院,北京100871 [2]清华大学公共管理学院,北京100084 [3]浙江大学中国农村发展研究院,杭州310030 [4]浙江大学公共管理学院,杭州310030

出　　处：《地理研究》2024年第10期2558-2579,共22页Geographical Research

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(20ZDA109);广东省科技创新战略专项资金重点项目(pdjh2022a0007)。

摘　　要：作为公共物品的耕地资源长期面临过度占用与补充有限的保护困境。为理解中国式分权制度背景下地方政府的耕地保护行为,基于中国县域分权(省直管县改革与扩权改革)的改革实践,探究分权时序塑造的激励约束环境如何通过财政收支影响耕地保护。其中,分权时序是指各省在推行分权改革时下放不同类型权力的顺序。研究发现:①财政分权先行有助于耕地保护,行政分权先行不利于耕地保护,而财政与行政分权并行的方式对耕地保护的影响不显著。②机制分析显示,分权时序通过影响地方政府财政收支的“开源”和“节流”来影响其耕地保护行为。具体而言,财政分权先行通过抑制地方政府的收入开源(减少耕地占用税的征收、降低耕地用于土地出让的比例与面积)减少耕地占用,通过抑制地方政府的支出节流(提升农业支出的数额和比例)减少耕地弃置实现耕地保护;行政分权先行通过促进地方政府的收入开源(强化耕地占用税的征收、提高耕地用于土地出让的比例与面积)加剧耕地占用,通过促进地方政府的支出节流(降低农业支出的数额和比例)加剧耕地弃置最终不利于耕地保护。③异质性分析显示,分权时序对于耕地保护的影响因各级政府权责安排、分权的具体内容事项而异。对于财权先行的地区,如果分权制度中明确规定了各级地方政府的收支责任,财政分权先行对耕地保护的正向效应得以强化;对于行政先行的地区,如果下放的事权中包含与土地审批直接关联的权力,行政分权先行对耕地保护负向效应得以强化。本文为理解分权和公共物品供给的关系提供了一个新视角,同时为合理配置地方政府财政与行政权限以实现耕地保护提供经验启示。Cropland resources,as public goods,have long faced the dilemma of over occupation and limited protection.To comprehend the local government's behavior in protecting cropland under the backdrop of China's decentralized system,this paper,based on the county-level practice,explores how the incentive-constraint environment shaped by sequence of decentralization influences the local government's protection of cropland based on fiscal revenue and expenditure.The sequence of decentralization refers to the sequence in which different types of powers are devolved during the decentralization reform in each province.The study reveals that:(1)Implementing decentralization in the fiscal field first and then in the administrative field leads to better cropland protection,while implementing decentralization in the administrative field first and then in the fiscal field hinders it.Simultaneous fiscal and administrative decentralization does not significantly impact cultivated land protection.(2)Mechanism analysis shows that the sequence of decentralization affects the local government's protection of cropland by influencing fiscal revenue and expenditure through increasing income and reducing expenses.Specifically,fiscal decentralization,when prioritized,reduces cropland occupation by suppressing local government income(reducing the collection of land occupation taxes and lowering the proportion and area of cropland used for land transfers)and reduces cropland abandonment by curbing expenditure(increasing the amount and proportion of agricultural expenditure).Administrative decentralization,when prioritized,exacerbates cropland occupation by enhancing local government income(strengthening the collection of land occupation taxes and increasing the proportion and area of cropland used for land transfers)and exacerbates cropland abandonment by promoting expenditure reduction(decreasing the amount and proportion of agricultural expenditure),ultimately producing a negative effect on cropland protection.(3)Heterogeneity analysis indic

关 键 词：分权时序 财政分权先行 行政分权先行 财政收支 耕地保护 

分 类 号：F323.211[经济管理—产业经济] F812.8