政府与共享单车企业演化博弈模型分析  

Analysis of evolutionary game model between government and shared bicycle enterprises

作　　者：尹忠恺[1] 张旭 张家伟 YIN Zhongkai;ZHANG Xu;ZHANG Jiawei(School of Business Administration,Liaoning Technical University,Huludao 125105,China)

机构地区：[1]辽宁工程技术大学工商管理学院,辽宁葫芦岛125105

出　　处：《辽宁工程技术大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第4期266-272,共7页Journal of Liaoning Technical University(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：辽宁省教育厅科研项目(LJKR0145)。

摘　　要：针对共享单车企业的发展问题,基于循环经济视角,以政府和企业为研究对象,从降低政府监管成本和提高企业运营效率的角度出发,构建政府和企业双方演化博弈模型。研究表明:共享单车企业实施高质量单车策略的概率受政府实施积极监管策略概率的影响;共享单车企业选择高质量单车策略受运营成本、政府补贴、政府惩罚等3方面的影响。研究结论为共享单车企业健康发展和政府实施优化监管策略提供参考。In response to the development of shared bicycle enterprises,based on the perspective of a circular economy and focusing on governments and enterprises as research subjects,this study constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and enterprises starting from reducing government regulatory costs and enhancing enterprise operational efficiency.The results indicate that the probability of shared bicycle enterprises implementing high-quality bicycle strategies is influenced by the government's likelihood of adopting proactive regulatory strategies.The choice of shared bicycle enterprises for high-quality bicycle strategies is affected by three factors:operational costs,government subsidies,and government penalties.The conclusions of this study provide references for the healthy development of shared bicycle enterprises and the optimization of government regulatory strategies.

关 键 词：共享单车企业 循环经济 政府监管 企业运营效率 演化博弈 

分 类 号：C936[经济管理—管理学]