战略文化与道德风险:理解中印边界摩擦新视角  

Strategic Culture and Moral Hazard:A New Perspective on Sino-Indian Border Tensions

作　　者：张立[1] 辛逸伦 By Zhang Li;Xin Yilun

机构地区：[1]四川大学南亚研究所

出　　处：《南亚研究》2024年第3期1-25,155,共26页South Asian Studies

摘　　要：本文将中印争议边界视作一组复杂的国家间契约问题,认为国家战略文化偏好特性决定了他国在双方争议边界问题上道德风险程度的强弱,进而影响边界摩擦发生的烈度与频率.以中印洞朗对峙及加勒万河谷冲突事件为案例,本文探讨我国合作型战略文化与印度道德风险行为两者间关联机制及体现,认为在忽略其他因素的前提下,我国合作型战略文化偏好从契约性质、制度安排和策略选项等方面为印度在争议边界的道德风险行为塑造了某种保护激励机制,埋下了双方边界摩擦隐患.为此,本文建议我国修正完善相关契约,增强威慑性,力争减少并有效防范来自他国的道德风险挑战.This paper treats the Sino-Indian border as a complex issue of interstate agreements,where preferences and characteristics of the national strategic culture of one state influence the moral hazard-related behavior of another,affecting the intensity and frequency of border conflicts.Using the Doklam standoff and Galwan Valley conflict as case studies,this paper explores the link between China's cooperative strategic culture and India's moral hazard-related behaviors.The paper argues,assuming other factors are constant,that the preferences of China's cooperative strategic culture inadvertently created a protective incentive mechanism for India's risk-taking behaviors at the border,thereby laying the groundwork for future tensions.To address this,the paper recommends that China revise and improve relevant agreements to enhance deterrence and reduce and effectively prevent moral hazard-related behavior of other countries.

关 键 词：战略文化 道德风险 边界契约 洞朗对峙 加勒万河谷冲突 

分 类 号：D835.1[政治法律—政治学]