并购业绩承诺完成质量何以提升?——来自媒体监督的证据  

How Could the Quality of Completion of M&A Performance Commitment Be Improved-Evidence from Media

作　　者：徐亚飞 孟庆玺 XU Yafei;MENG Qingxi(School of Accounting,Capital University of Economics and Business;Center for Accounting Studies/School of Management,Xiamen University)

机构地区：[1]首都经济贸易大学会计学院,北京100070 [2]厦门大学会计发展研究中心/管理学院,福建厦门361005

出　　处：《金融研究》2024年第6期188-206,共19页Journal of Financial Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72202194);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(20720221051);首都经济贸易大学新入职青年教师科研启动基金项目(XRZ2023041)的资助。

摘　　要：并购双方签订的业绩补偿承诺协议,是保护投资者利益的关键手段。然而,实践中大量业绩承诺完成质量不高,甚至可能存在被操纵的现象(比如精准达标),降低了并购市场效率。在此背景下,本文首先检验业绩承诺完成过程中的操纵行为,并在此基础上探究业绩承诺完成质量的提升方式。研究发现,业绩承诺操纵现象普遍存在,但媒体监督可以显著抑制业绩承诺操纵行为。当公司管理层进行业绩承诺操纵的动机较强、机会较大以及媒体报道内容的原创性较弱时,媒体监督对抑制业绩承诺操纵的作用效果变弱,反之更强。机制分析发现,媒体监督主要是通过提高投资者关注程度、审计监督投入和监管压力三个渠道发挥作用。研究结论表明,需要关注业绩承诺操纵现象,并积极借助媒体等市场中介在并购重组活动中发挥的治理作用,提升业绩承诺完成质量,保护中小投资者利益。M&A plays an important role in the process of promoting high-quality development.However,due to the imperfection of internal and external governance,the M&A market is full of chaos.This phenomenon hinders the potential path of optimizing resource allocation efficiency through M&A to achieve high-quality development.In the A-share market,performance compensation commitment is originally an important way to protect investors'interests.However,a large number of performance commitments are not completed with high quality,and there may be manipulation(such as precise compliance),which reduces the efficiency of the market.This article identifies the performance commitment manipulation with empirical research methods and explores the way to improve the performance commitment fulfillment quality.By manually collecting the completion of performance commitment agreements signed by A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2021,the study finds that performance commitment manipulation is widespread,and media monitoring could significantly suppress performance commitment manipulation.In terms of the motivation of performance commitment manipulation is stronger,the opportunity is larger,and the originality of media coverage is lower,the governance effect of media monitoring is weaker,and vice versa.According to the mechanism analysis,media monitoring mainly plays the role through three channels:increasing investors'attention,audit supervision input,and regulatory pressure.The conclusions indicate that the market needs to notice the performance commitment manipulation and utilize the governance role of the media to improve the quality of performance completion and protect the interests of small and medium-sized investors.Therefore,this study proposes the following policy recommendations:First,the conclusions confirm the important role of the media in improving the performance of M&A.The media should be fully utilized as an external governance force to maintain the order of the capital market.Second,media has the characteri

关 键 词：业绩承诺操纵 媒体监督 投资者关注 审计监督投入 监管压力 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F271[文化科学—传播学] G206