网络平台互动能抑制企业违规吗?——来自交易所网络互动平台的经验证据  

Can Online Platform Interaction Curb Corporate Violations?Evidence From Stock Exchange Online Interactive Platforms

作　　者：王璐 白晶 周博 WANG Lu;BAI Jing;ZHOU Bo(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;School of Accounting,Dalian University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116622,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]大连财经学院会计学院,辽宁大连116622

出　　处：《财经问题研究》2024年第10期81-92,共12页Research On Financial and Economic Issues

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“基于金融科技的风险识别与投资者关注研究”(23YJA630014)。

摘　　要：数字时代交易所网络互动平台在完善公司治理和抑制企业违规等方面的作用引发了广泛关注。本文以“互动易”平台和“上证e互动”平台为切入点,基于2014—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司数据,采用Logistic模型实证检验了网络平台互动对企业违规的影响及其作用机制。研究结果显示:网络平台互动能抑制企业违规,这体现了外部治理的有效性;在非四大会计师事务所审计的企业、机构投资者持股低的企业、信息互动回复强度大的企业和信息回复及时性强的企业中,网络平台互动对企业违规的抑制作用更明显;网络平台互动通过提升企业信息透明度和企业内部治理水平抑制企业违规。本文的研究不仅为监管机构完善信息披露机制和抑制企业违规提供了经验证据,而且为深化资本市场改革和推动经济高质量发展提供了参考。With the advancement of the Internet and big data technologies,stock exchange online interactive platforms have rapidly emerged,providing a new channel for real⁃time communication between investors and corporations.This interaction mode enhances the speed and fairness of information acquisition,helping investors better understand corporate information.It provides companies with immediate feedback opportunities,improving the quality of firm disclosure.However,there is no clear answer as to whether these interactive platforms can effectively curb corporate violations.This paper uses data from Chinese A⁃share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2014 to 2021 with a logistic model to examine the impact of stock exchange online interactive platforms on corporate violations and its mechanisms.The findings reveal that interactive platforms do mitigate corporate violations,indicating that this new interaction mode effectively enhances the external governance role of investors.The conclusions are robust and verified through a series of endogeneity treatments and robustness tests.Heterogeneity analysis shows that online platform interactions significantly affect corporate violations,especially in non⁃Big Four audited firms,firms with low institutional investor shareholdings,firms with high⁃intensity interaction responses,and firms with strong interaction timeliness.Mechanism analysis indicates that interactive platforms reduce corporate violations by enhancing information transparency and improving internal governance.Further analysis shows that these platforms curb both information disclosure violations and operational and transactional violations.The main marginal contributions of this paper are as follows.First,this paper enriches research on corporate violations.While existing literature primarily analyzes the influencing factors of corporate violations from the perspectives of macroeconomic policies,corporate governance structures,and information disclosure,this paper explores the

关 键 词：网络平台互动 企业违规 交易所网络互动平台 信息透明度 内部治理水平 

分 类 号：F832.5[经济管理—金融学]