官员生态问责对河长制政策成效的影响及作用机制  

Impact of officials'ecological accountability on the effectiveness of the river chief system and its mechanisms

作　　者：张振波 闫钊 金太军 ZHANG Zhenbo;YAN Zhao;JIN Taijun(School of Public Administration,Zhejiang University of Financial and Economics,Hangzhou Zhejiang 310018,China;School of Public Administration,Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing Jiangsu 211815,China)

机构地区：[1]浙江财经大学公共管理学院,浙江杭州310018 [2]南京审计大学公共管理学院,江苏南京211815

出　　处：《中国人口·资源与环境》2024年第8期70-79,共10页China Population,Resources and Environment

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“‘三不腐’一体促进的能力建设与评价指标体系研究”(批准号:23ZDA133)。

摘　　要：根据环保权责在纵向政府之间的配置趋向,可划分为环保监管集权和环境治理分权两种实践模式;其各自呈现鲜明治理优势,却又分别存在难以规避的内在体制困境。河长制政策统一了自上而下的压力型体制和官僚控制、自下而上的治理责任明确与治理任务分工,一方面在权能下放、责任划分、社会公开等治理过程中呈现出典型的分权化治理逻辑,另一方面又以治理权责分级分域、党政领导直接定责以及地方官员显性责任即时惩戒等集权化环保监管为条件。正是因为河长制政策兼具监管集权与治理分权两种机制优势,因此成为该研究解析环保集权-分权悖论的可行政策工具。该研究以7大流域中由地级市主要官员担任河长的河流为样本,基于多期双重差分模型,实证检验了官员生态问责纠正、补充区域环保政策的效应机制。研究发现:①河长制政策施行显著降低了河流污染物浓度,实现了流域环境的整体改善;②晋升激励能够对河长制政策成效产生显著影响,即相较于以经济增长为目标的官员激励,强化官员考核中的生态问责更能提升河长制这一分权化环境治理模式的治理效能;③生态问责对河长制治理成效的促进作用,在政府环保注意力配置更低、环境治理财政投入与监管能力相对不足的区域中更为明显,表明环保集权能够在一定程度上修正和纠补治理分权下的区域间政策落差与偏差,进而能够克服地方环保治理中的政绩偏好替代、生态政策执行低效、环境治理碎片化与“搭便车”等问题。该研究发现调和了环保监管集权与环境治理分权之间的理论冲突,指出两者环境治理实践中可以呈现为互为条件、相互支撑的补充关系。According to the vertical allocation of power and responsibility in environmental protection,two practical models can be distinguished:centralized environmental supervision and decentralized environmental governance.They not only offer distinct governance advantages,but also entail inevitable internal institutional dilemmas.The river chief system policy effectively addresses these dilemmas by integrating top-down bureaucratic control and bottom-up division of responsibilities.On the one hand,it exemplifies a decentralized approach through authority empowerment,responsibility allocation,and public transparency.On the other hand,it operates within a framework of decentralized governmental supervision that includes hierarchical power and responsibility divisions,direct determination of accountability by party and government leaders,and immediate punishment for explicit responsibilities.The integration of the dual institutional advantages renders the river chief system a viable policy instrument for reconciling the centralization–decentralization paradox in environmental protection.Our research sample comprised data extracted from the seven major river basins in China,with a specific focus on rivers where major officials at the prefectural level assumed the role of river chief.Employing the model of differencein-differences with multiple time periods,this paper empirically investigated how local officials'ecological accountability rectified regional environmental policies.The findings demonstrated that:①The implementation of the river chief system significantly mitigated pollutant intensities in the sampled rivers,thereby enhancing the environmental conditions within the targeted watershed.②The promotion incentive could have a significant impact on the outcomes of this policy;specifically,when compared to growth-oriented official inspirations,strengthening ecological accountability in official assessment could enhance the governing effects of the river chief system.③The impact of ecological accountability on

关 键 词：环保监管集权 环境治理分权 官员生态问责 区域环境政策 河长制政策 

分 类 号：D601[政治法律—政治学]