企业投资“脱实向虚”、内外部治理机制与审计定价——来自中国A股上市公司的经验证据  

The Investment of Enterprises"From Real to Virtual",Internal and External Governance Mechanisms and Audit Pricing-Empirical Evidence from Chinese A-share listed companies

作　　者：胡海川 贾望藤 HU Hai-chuan;JIA Wang-teng(School of Management,Hebei GEO University,Shijiazhuang,China,050031;Research Base for Scientific-Technological Innovation and Regional Economic Sustainable Development of Hebei Province,Hebei GEO University,Shijiazhuang,China,050031)

机构地区：[1]河北地质大学管理学院,河北石家庄050031 [2]河北地质大学河北省科技创新与区域经济可持续发展研究基地,河北石家庄050031

出　　处：《财经理论研究》2024年第5期74-94,共21页Journal of Finance and Economics Theory

基　　金：河北省高等学校科学研究项目(SQ2022015)。

摘　　要：企业投资“脱实向虚”是当前我国经济发展较为突出的结构性矛盾,有效的审计活动能否及时识别企业投资“脱实向虚”中的潜在风险及不利影响并最终反映于审计定价上,是值得深入讨论的问题。选取2013—2021年我国沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究样本,综合运用面板回归模型探析企业投资“脱实向虚”对审计定价的影响及作用路径。研究发现:企业投资“脱实向虚”程度越高,审计定价水平越高;(内部治理层面,企业投资“脱实向虚”行为显著提高了代理成本,增加了审计服务的难度与风险,促使审计师收取更高的审计费用;外部治理层面,分析师关注在一定程度上促进了企业投资“脱实向虚”负面影响的扩散,并对股价产生影响,提高了审计师对风险的感知,进而强化了企业“脱实向虚”投资行为对审计定价的正向影响。以上结论均稳健。拓展性研究发现:分析师关注会对代理成本的中介效应发挥调节作用,审计师对企业投资“脱实向虚”行为的敏感度在国有企业、中西部地区、融资约束高的企业更加强烈。据此提出,政府需完善市场机制,加强金融监管;企业要优化资产配置,警惕非理性投资行为;审计行业要强化风险意识,保持职业谨慎;分析师行业应提高分析师专业能力,构建更完善的分析师市场体系。最终的研究结论为政府监管部门、企业以及审计服务中介机构认识“脱实向虚”行为提供了新的视角,为企业升级转型以及审计服务质量的改进提供了经验证据。The current economic development in China is characterized by a significant structural contradiction known as the"de-realization to virtual"of enterprise investments.Timely auditing can help identify potential risks and adverse effects of this phenomenon,ultimately impacting pricing.It is worthwhile to delve into it thoroughly.Selecting China Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share non-financial listed companies from 2013 to 2021 as the research sample,this study comprehensively utilizes panel regression models to explore the impact and action path of enterprises′investment behavior"from real to virtual"on audit pricing.The research findings are as follows:(1)Transitioning corporate investment from real to virtual will lead to higher audit pricing;(2)Internally,shifting investment behavior from real to virtual significantly raises agency costs,complicates and increases risk for audit services,and encourages auditors to charge higher fees;(3)Externally,analysts′focus partially contributes to spreading the negative effects of companies′shift towards virtual investment behavior,impacting stock prices and increasing auditors′risk perception,thus bolstering the positive impact of virtual investment behavior on audit pricing.The conclusions stated above are strong and sound.The extended study discovered that the impact of analysts′focus on the mediation of agency costs is influenced by auditors′attentiveness to companies′investment decisions shifting"from physical to online"is more pronounced in state-owned enterprises,as well as in central and western regions and companies facing high financial constraints.Hence,there is a suggestion for the government to enhance market system development and reinforce financial monitoring and control;for companies to improve asset distribution and prevent illogical investment actions;for the auditing sector to boost risk awareness and uphold professional caution;for the analyst field to enhance analysts′expertise and establish a more comprehensive analyst market system.The ulti

关 键 词：投资“脱实向虚” 审计定价 治理机制 代理问题 分析师关注 

分 类 号：F239.6[经济管理—会计学] F832.48[经济管理—国民经济]