经营投资问责制度与国有企业并购质量  

The Accountability System for Operation and Investment and the Quality of State-owned Enterprises'Mergers and Acquisitions

作　　者：陈冬 陈艳[1,2] Chen Dong;Chen Yan(School of Accounting,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China;China Internal Control Research Center,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics,Dalian 116025,China)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025 [2]东北财经大学中国内部控制研究中心,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《数量经济研究》2024年第3期166-189,共24页The Journal of Quantitative Economics

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目“基于金融科技的风险识别与投资者关注研究”(23YJA630014)的资助。

摘　　要：以分阶段实施的经营投资问责制度为准自然实验,从并购角度考察经营投资问责制度对国有企业高质量发展的影响。研究发现,经营投资问责制度促使国有企业并购呈现“量降质升”的良好态势,这种影响主要通过减少管理层短视行为、抑制管理层风险偏好和提升内部控制质量来实现。异质性分析表明,在法治环境薄弱、公司治理水平低和分析师关注少的企业中,经营投资问责制度的作用更加显著。进一步分析发现,经营投资问责制度可以促进国有资本保值增值。研究结论证实了经营投资问责制度的有效性,为推动国有企业高质量发展提供了政策启示。This paper investigates the impact of the accountability system for operation and investment on the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises from the perspective of mergers and acquisitions,through a quasi-natural experiment on the phased nationwide implementation of the policy.We find that the accountability system for operation and investment has contributed to the positive trend of“quantity down,quality up”in M&A of SOEs,which is mainly achieved by reducing managerial myopia behaviors,curbing management's risk seeking and improving internal control quality.Cross-sectional evidence suggests that the accountability system has a more pronounced effect in firms with a weak legal environment,low levels of corporate governance,and low analyst attention.Further analysis indicates that the accountability system has a positive effect on maintaining and increasing the value of state-owned capital.The research findings confirm the effectiveness of the accountability system for operation and investment,providing policy insights for promoting the high-quality development of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：经营投资问责制度 并购质量 国企改革 高质量发展 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济]