基于前景理论的突发事件网络舆情治理三方演化博弈分析  

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis of Emergency Network Public Opinion Governance Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：魏淑婷 王迪 Wei Shuting;Wang Di(School of Management Science and Engineering,Anhui University of Technology,Maanshan Anhui 243032)

机构地区：[1]安徽工业大学管理科学与工程学院,安徽马鞍山243032

出　　处：《情报探索》2024年第10期39-47,共9页Information Research

摘　　要：[目的/意义]旨在为突发事件中网络舆情的科学治理提供参考。[方法/过程]首先,界定治理过程中参与主体间的博弈关系,基于前景理论给出感知收益矩阵;其次,构建“网民-网络平台-政府”三方演化博弈模型;最后,进行数值仿真实验,探究主体的风险敏感性和损失规避敏感性对博弈结果的影响,进而提出突发事件中网络舆情治理的相关建议。[结果/结论]网络平台的损失规避敏感性和政府的风险敏感性均会影响博弈结果,适当增大风险敏感度系数和减小损失规避系数有利于加快系统到达最优演化稳定策略。[Purpose/significance]The paper aims to provide reference for the scientific governance of network public opinion in emergencies.[Method/process]Firstly,this paper defines the game relationship between the participants in the governance process,and gives the perceived benefit matrix based on prospect theory;secondly,builds a tripartite evolutionary game model of“netizens-network platform-government”;finally,conducts numerical simulation experiments to explore the impact of the risk sensitivity and loss aversion sensitivity of the subject on the game results,and then puts forward relevant suggestions for the governance of network public opinion in emergencies.[Result/conclusion]The loss aversion sensitivity of the network platform and the risk sensitivity of the government will both affect the game results.Appropriately increasing the risk sensitivity coefficient and reducing the loss aversion coefficient will help accelerate the system to reach the optimal evolutionary stability strategy.

关 键 词：突发事件 网络舆情 前景理论 三方演化博弈 

分 类 号：G206.3[文化科学—传播学]