ESG评级分歧与独立董事薪酬  

ESG Rating Divergence and Independent Director Compensation

作　　者：杨洲 YANG Zhou(School of Business,Anhui University,Hefei 23060l,China)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥.230601

出　　处：《唐山师范学院学报》2024年第5期87-93,共7页Journal of Tangshan Normal University

基　　金：安徽省自然科学基金优青项目(2208085Y22);安徽省高校杰出青年项目(2022AH020001)。

摘　　要：基于2009-2021年中国资本市场A股上市公司样本,从独立董事薪酬角度研究了ESG评级分歧的经济后果。研究发现:(1)ESG评级分歧越大,独立董事的薪酬越高;(2)基于风险补偿与声誉补偿视角的机制检验表明,ESG评级分歧主要通过影响独立董事任职风险进而影响独立董事薪酬;(3)异质性分析表明,在非国有控股、独立董事职业忧虑度高以及外部监督质量较低的企业中,ESG评级分歧与独立董事薪酬之间的正向关系更为显著。Taking A-share listed companies in China capital market from 2009 to 2021 as samples,the economic consequences of ESG rating differences are studied from the perspective of independent directors'remuneration.The findings are as follows:(1)The greater the differences in ESG ratings,the higher the compensation of independent directors;(2)From the perspective of risk compensation and reputation com-pensation,the mechanism test shows that ESG rating differences mainly affect the independent directors'employment risk and then affect their compensation;(3)Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive relationship between ESG rating differences and independent directors'compensation is more significant in enterprises with non-state-owned shares,high professional anxiety of independent directors and low quality of external supervision.

关 键 词：ESG评级分歧 独立董事薪酬 任职风险 风险补偿 声誉补偿 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]