考虑环保信用整体评级的环境污染第三方治理演化博弈分析  

Analysis of the Evolution Game of Environmental Pollution Third Party Governance Considering the Overall Rating of Environmental Protection Credit

作　　者：廖文俊 张浩 LIAO Wenjun;ZHANG Hao(School of Economics and Management,Huaibei Normal University,Huaibei Anhui,235000)

机构地区：[1]淮北师范大学经济与管理学院,安徽淮北235000

出　　处：《山西大同大学学报（自然科学版）》2024年第5期56-67,108,共13页Journal of Shanxi Datong University(Natural Science Edition)

基　　金：安徽省哲学社会科学规划项目[AHSKQ2020D28]。

摘　　要：为提升环境污染第三方治理中多方环境行为,尤其针对第三方治理中环境污染责任难以界定导致监管难的问题,构建排污企业、治污企业、地方政府三方参与的演化博弈模型,重点研究实施环保信用评级对环境污染第三方治理带来的影响。研究表明,排污企业环保信用评级是实现排污企业、地方政府策略选择协同优化的有效措施;政府补助不能实现治污企业、地方政府策略选择的协同优化,而环保信用评级可以实现;相比排污企业,治污企业对环保信用评级更加敏感。然而对排污企业或治污企业实施环保信用评级均无法实现三者策略选择的协同优化,进而提出了环保信用整体评级机制,并验证了该机制的有效性;参数分析发现,实现三者策略选择协同优化的关键是提升治污企业环保信用评级收益;互赔系数的提高有助于排污企业、治污企业策略选择的优化,但取值过高会降低地方政府选择“积极监管”策略的概率。建议政府应积极实施排污企业与治污企业环保信用评级,并通过强化排污企业与治污企业相互监管的机制设计来优化监管方式。In order to improve the multi party environmental behavior in the third party governance of environmental pollution,especially for the problem that it is difficult to define the environmental pollution responsibility in the third party governance,an evolutionary game model with the participation of pollutant discharge enterprises,pollution control enterprises and local governments is built,and the impact of implementing environmental credit rating on the third-party governance of environmental pollution is emphatically studied.The research shows that the environmental credit rating of pollutant discharge enterprises is an effective measure to realize the coordinated optimization of the strategy selection of pollutant discharge enterprises and local governments;The government subsidy can not realize the coordinated optimization of the strategy selection of pollution control enterprises and local governments,while the environmental credit rating can be achieved;Compared with pollution discharge enterprises,pollution control enterprises are more sensitive to environmental credit rating.However,the implementation of environmental credit rating for pollution discharge enterprises or pollution control enterprises can not achieve the collaborative optimization of the three strategies,and then put forward the overall rating mechanism of environmental credit,and verified the effectiveness of the mechanism;Further parameter analysis shows that the key to realize the collaborative optimization of the three strategies is to improve the environmental credit rating income of pollution control enterprises;The increase of mutual compensation coefficient is helpful to the optimization of the strategy choice of pollutant discharge enterprises and pollution control enterprises,but if the value is too high,the probability of local governments choosing the“active supervision”strategy will be reduced.It is suggested that the government should actively implement the environmental credit rating of pollution discharge enterprises and

关 键 词：环境污染 第三方治理 环保信用评级 政府补助 演化博弈 

分 类 号：X323[环境科学与工程—环境工程]