产出随机环境下制造商产能投资和共享模式选择  

Manufacturer's Selection between Capacity Investment and Capacity Sharing Considering Random Yield

作　　者：肖巍 李凯[2] XIAO Wei;LI Kai(Business School,Hohai University,Nanjing 211000,China;Schoo of Management,Hefei University of Technology,Hefei 230009,China)

机构地区：[1]河海大学商学院,江苏南京211100 [2]合肥工业大学管理学院,安徽合肥230009

出　　处：《工程管理科技前沿》2024年第5期59-68,共10页Frontiers of Science and Technology of Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871076,72271070);安徽省自然科学基金杰青资助项目(2208085J07);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(423180)。

摘　　要：共享经济的迅速发展促进了社会闲置资源的充分利用,解决了供求不匹配的问题。本文针对制造企业产能受限的情形,考虑一个由制造商、产能供应方、共享平台构成的三级供应链,其中产能供应方的产出是随机的。为比较产能投资和共享两种模式,构建以产能供应方为主导的三阶段Stackelberg博弈模型,并通过逆向归纳法进行求解。研究表明:首先,无论共享平台如何分配产能供应延迟惩罚收入,其利润总是随着服务费率的增加而先增加后减小;其次,共享平台将产能延迟供应惩罚收入留给自己并不一定总是最优的,当市场潜在需求较小或者制造商的原始产能较大时,共享平台应该将延迟惩罚收入给制造商;再次,制造商向产能供应方订购的产能数量和产能供应方的生产量呈线性关系;最后,只有当单位产能投资成本小于某一阈值时,制造商才会选择扩建产能。研究结论丰富了共享经济环境下基于平台的产能共享相关研究成果,同时也为平台运营者以及受产能约束的制造商提供了决策依据。The rapid development of the sharing economy,especially its innovative applications in the manufacturing sector,has provided manufacturers with additional ways to supplement capacity.Through the capacity-sharing platform,accurate matching between the capacity supply and demand can be achieved.However,utilizing capacity from platform suppliers incurs inherent risks,such as uncertainties in quality and yield rates.In practice,manufacturers have two different attitudes toward supply uncertainty and the difference lies in whether the actual capacity supply must strictly match the ordered quantity.Collaborative sharing facilitates the efficient integration of underutilized manufacturing capacities and effectively addresses societal conflicts stemming from escalating land resource costs and mounting pressures on resources and the environment,which significantly improves social production efficiency and economicbenefits.This paper considers a three-tier supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a capacity supplier,and a sharing platform,where the capacity supplier's output is subject to randomness.We establish a three-stage Stackelberg game model,designating the supplier as the leader and the manufacturer as the follower,and the perfect equilibrium of the subgame is solved by backward induction.All supply chain members make independent decisions to maximize their own profits.We compare two capacity replenishment modes from the manufacturer's perspective:investing in capacity expansion and participating in capacity sharing.In the capacity sharing mode,the distribution of the supply delay penalty income from the supplier is examined.We also explore the ordering strategy of the manufacturer and the production strategy of the capacity supplier.Numerical analysis is employed to discuss the influence of some key parameters on the optimal decisions and profit of each supply chain player.The main research findings are as follows:(1)The impact of platform service fee on its profit is non-monotonic,no matter how the sharing platf

关 键 词：产能共享 产能投资 运营模式 共享平台 随机产出 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济]