基于专业水平异质接包方的众包平台收费模式  

Charging model of crowdsourcing platform based on professional-level heterogeneous solvers

作　　者：毕功兵[1] 徐天赐 徐扬 王欢芳[2] Bi Gongbing;Xu Tianci;Xu Yang;Wang Huanfang(School of Managemnet,University of Science and Technology of China,Hefei 230026,China;School of Business,Hunan University of Technology,Zhuzhou 412008,China)

机构地区：[1]中国科学技术大学管理学院,安徽合肥230026 [2]湖南工业大学商学院,湖南株洲412008

出　　处：《系统工程学报》2024年第5期655-664,共10页Journal of Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71731010);国家社会科学基金资助项目(20BJY093).

摘　　要：众包平台在连接发包方和接包方及提升创新绩效方面起到了关键作用.重点考虑平台固定额度收费模式和固定奖金比例收费模式对发包方最优奖金设置、期望收益及接包方绩效水平的影响.博弈均衡状态下,固定额度收费模式总能促使发包方设置更高的奖金和激励接包方实现更高的创新绩效水平.不同收费模式下发包方最优收益主要由收费额度影响.最后,证明了平台的最优收费函数是一个随着奖金增加而增加的凹函数.Crowdsourcing platforms play a key role in connecting employers and receivers and improving innovation performance.The influence of thefixed quota charging mode and thefixed bonus ratio charging mode on the optimal bonus setting,expected revenue,and the performance level of the receiver party is mainly considered.Under the state of game equilibrium,thefixed fee quota mode can always prompt the employer to set a higher bonus and motivate the recipient to achieve a higher level of innovation performance.The optimal revenue of the employer under different charging modes is mainly affected by the amount of charges.The results show that the higher coefficient of return on effort enables the employer to benefit from thefixed quota model.Finally,it is proven that the optimal charging function of the platform is a concave function that increases with the increase in bonus.

关 键 词：众包竞赛 平台 收费模式 专业水平 博弈论 

分 类 号：TP273[自动化与计算机技术—检测技术与自动化装置]