信贷包容,企业投资与过度外推偏差  

Credit support,endogenous investment and overextrapolation bias

作　　者：林春鹏 杨金强[1,2] LIN Chunpeng;YANG Jinqiang(School of Finance,Shanghai University of Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China;Shanghai Institute of International Finance and Economics,Shanghai 200433,China)

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学金融学院,上海200433 [2]上海国际金融与经济研究院,上海200433

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2024年第6期72-83,共12页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71772112、71972122、72072108)。

摘　　要：本文研究了关系型贷款业务中银行包容度与企业内生投资对银企价值的互动影响,并引入过度外推的认知偏差,考察非理性决策互动对双方价值的影响。研究发现,银行信贷包容度与贷款利率间呈“倒U型”关系,银企双方存在各自的最优利率。银行在认知偏差下提供的高包容度促进了企业投贷,企业在认知偏差下的过度投资提高了银行信贷包容度,弱化了非理性决策的负面影响。本文从行为金融角度拓展了银企合作的理论研究,指出银企决策间的互动是关系型贷款模型克服信息不对称、化解中小企业“融资难”问题的关键特征。Small and medium-sized enterprises are a new force in the development of the national economy and society,but the financing difficulties and expensive financing problems they face are still prominent.This paper re-examines the impact of relational loan interest rates on the value of banks and enterprises by examining the theoretical mechanism of the interaction between banks′credit tolerance and endogenous investment in enterprises.From the perspective of behavioral finance,it provides a new theoretical explanation and solution to the problem of financing difficulties for small and medium-sized enterprises.In the first block of this paper,under the bank-enterprise cooperation model of relational loans,the endogenous investment of enterprises is introduced to describe the loan demand,and the semi-closed solution of the optimal decision and value of both parties is given.The credit support provided by banks affects enterprise value and endogenous investment motivation,while enterprise investment determines the current profit level of banks.This interaction of decision-making between banks and enterprises makes the effects of relational loan interest rates different from the ones in existing theories.The numerical simulation results indicate that this interactive influence process makes both parties have their own optimal loan interest rates.Bank′s credit tolerance no longer changes monotonically with the loan interest rate,as in previous studies.Instead,as the loan rate increases,the bank value increases first as unit loan profit increases,leading to higher credit tolerance and a lower suspension boundary.As the loan rate increases further,the investment incentives of enterprises are suppressed,resulting in reduced loan demand,lower bank profitability and decreased credit tolerance.The optimal loan rate for banks is the trade-off between unit profit and credit demand.For enterprises,higher loan rates reduce investment incentives while providing extra credit tolerance,which lowers the loan suspension risk.The op

关 键 词：信贷包容 关系型贷款 企业投资 过度外推 

分 类 号：F830[经济管理—金融学] C931[经济管理—管理学]