附加条件问题与融贯性约束  

The Proviso Problem and Coherence

作　　者：樊达 Fan Da

机构地区：[1]武汉大学哲学学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《河南社会科学》2024年第11期114-124,共11页Henan Social Sciences

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重大项目“西方语言哲学前沿问题研究”(23&ZD240)。

摘　　要：多种文献中流行的预设投射理论都预言,在条件句P→Q中,Q的预设ps(Q)会以条件命题P→ps(Q)的形式投射为整个条件句的预设。这一预测受到反例的挑战,即所谓的“附加条件问题”。面对这类反例,学者试图诉诸一些语用学说来捍卫上述预设投射理论。曼德尔克恩提出了一些新的反例,旨在论证任何此类的诉诸语用学的努力都不成功。通过论证可以说明,曼德尔克恩的论证所依赖的一个隐含假设可能是错误的,他的反例其实可以用标准的语用学解释来应对。Various theories of presupposition projection predict that,in a conditional P→Q,the presupposition ps(Q)of Q projects in a conditional form P→ps(Q)as a presupposition of the whole conditional.This prediction is challenged by counterexamples,known as the proviso problem.To explain away the counterexamples,attempts has been made by appeal to some pragmatic accounts.Mandelkern(2016)offers some examples that purport to resist any such pragmatic account.The objective of this paper is to argue that Mandelkern’s argument relies on an implicit assumption which may be false,and his counterexamples can be explained away in a standard pragmatic way.

关 键 词：预设投射 附加条件问题 语用学 

分 类 号：A8[哲学宗教—马克思主义哲学]