禁止性补贴扩大论的理论思辨与中国因应  

Theoretical Speculation on the Expansion of Prohibited Subsidy and China’s Response

作　　者：徐昕[1] XU Xin

机构地区：[1]上海对外经贸大学,上海200236

出　　处：《国际商务研究》2024年第6期52-65,共14页International Business Research

基　　金：国家社科基金一般项目“美欧针对我国有企业加强国际造法带来的挑战及应对研究”(项目编号:20BFX203)。

摘　　要：WTO《补贴与反补贴措施协定》规定了有限的禁止性补贴范围,对此,美欧在晚近WTO改革以及新一轮的区域贸易协定中提议予以扩大。美欧扩大禁止性补贴的倡议和实践将传统的贸易救济规则与竞争政策规则进行制度性叠加,同时将禁止性补贴与中国的非市场经济导向和国有企业等问题捆绑在一起,共同服务于打压中国经济发展模式的战略。中国应明确,禁止性补贴的修订和完善应在贸易救济的制度框架下予以系统推进,坚持后果评估标准,不带所有制偏见。在此前提下,中国可以结合反补贴争端解决的实践以及国内经济体制改革的方向,适当增列禁止性补贴类型,同时恢复对补贴造成严重侵害的法律推定并优化其条款。The United States and EU proposed to explore the scope of prohibited subsidies that were clearly stipulated in the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures in the recent WTO reform and the new round of FTAs.These initiatives and practices systematically superimpose the traditional trade remedy rules and competition rules,and tie the prohibited subsidies with China’s non-market economic orientation and state-owned enterprise to serve the strategy of suppressing China’s economic development model.China should make it clear that the revision and improvement of prohibited subsidies should be systematically promoted under the framework of trade remedies,while adhering to the damage assessment criteria.In any case,prohibited subsidies should not have ownership bias against state-owned enterprises.Based on these principles and considering the practice of anti-subsidy dispute settlement and the direction of domestic reform,China can judiciously add certain types of prohibited subsidies and restore the legal presumption of serious prejudice while optimizing its provisions.

关 键 词：禁止性补贴 竞争政策 国有企业 严重侵害 

分 类 号：D996[政治法律—经济法学]