基于前景理论的废旧动力电池非正规回收渠道研究  

Research on Informal Recycling Channels of Spent Power Battery Based on Prospect Theory

作　　者：许礼刚[1] 刘荣福 陈磊 贾扬蕾[1] XU Ligang;LIU Rongfu;CHEN Lei;JIA Yanglei(School of Economics and Management,Jiangxi University of Technology,Ganzhou 341000,China)

机构地区：[1]江西理工大学经济管理学院,江西赣州341000

出　　处：《绿色矿冶》2024年第5期7-14,共8页Sustainable Mining and Metallurgy

基　　金：江西省社会科学研究“十四五”(2022年)规划项目:江西省动力电池回收补偿机制及政策优化研究(22GL21)。

摘　　要：为提高废旧动力电池回收率,解决废旧动力电池流向不明的问题,以奖惩机制为核心,将演化博弈与前景理论耦合,建立动力电池制造商、非正规回收商和政府的三方演化博弈模型,探讨关键参数对博弈主体的影响,并将对应的现实应用场景体现出来。通过改变政府的初始监督概率,判断出消极合作的博弈主体;通过调整补贴或罚款分配比例,优化奖罚机制。研究结果表明,政府提高初始监督意愿,能加速动力电池制造商和非正规回收商之间信息交流;若动力电池制造商为消极合作的企业,政府应侧重于对其进行监督;从长远发展来看,把补贴分配比例集中于动力电池制造商,把罚款分配比例集中于非正规回收商,将更利于非正规回收商主动转型升级;提高风险态度系数和损失规避系数,能加快合作回收。In order to improve the recovery rate of waste power batteries and solve the problem of unknown flow direction of spent power batteries,taking the reward and punishment mechanism as the core,the evolutionary game and prospect theory were coupled to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of power battery manufacturers,informal recyclers and the government.The influence of key parameters on the game subject was discussed,and the corresponding practical application scenarios were reflected.By change the initial supervision probability of government,the game subject of negative cooperation was judged;By adjusting the distribution proportion of subsidies or fines,the reward and punishment mechanism were optimized.The results show that the government s willingness to improve the initial supervision can accelerate the information exchange between power battery manufacturers and informal recyclers;the power battery manufacturers are passive cooperative enterprises,and the government should focus on supervising them;in the long run,it will be more conducive to the active transformation and upgrading of informal recyclers to focus the distribution proportion of subsidies on power battery manufacturers and the distribution proportion of fines on informal recyclers;increasing the risk attitude coefficient and loss aversion coefficient can speed up cooperative recovery.

关 键 词：废旧动力电池 非正规渠道 演化博弈 奖惩机制 前景理论 

分 类 号：F426[经济管理—产业经济] X705[环境科学与工程—环境工程] TM912[电气工程—电力电子与电力传动]