公司破产临界期董事对债权人责任模式之选择  

Liability Mode Selection of Directors to Creditors During the Critical Period of Company Bankruptcy

作　　者：罗欢平[1] 谢毅 LUO Huanping;XIE Yi(Xiangtan University,Xiangtan 411105,China)

机构地区：[1]湘潭大学法学院,湖南湘潭411105

出　　处：《南华大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第5期85-91,共7页Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)

基　　金：湖南省教育厅重点项目“代偿取回权制度革新与拓展研究”资助(编号:22A0110)。

摘　　要：就公司破产临界期董事对债权人责任而言,可供借鉴的域外立法模式主要有破产申请迟延责任模式和不当交易责任模式两种。前者虽也契合董事信义义务转化理论,且可抑制董事的机会主义倾向,但赋予董事破产申请义务,要求董事及时辨明公司进入破产临界的时间并及时申请破产是对董事不合理的要求。后者不仅契合董事信义义务转化理论,且具有赋予董事更多选择权、更合理考虑商业风险的存在和与我国办理破产能力更适配等制度优势,是我国构建相关制度宜采用的规则模式。There are two referential out-of-town legislative modes of liability of directors to creditors during the critical period of company bankruptcy,that is,director s delayed bankruptcy application liability and director s improper transaction liability.Although the former can fit the fiduciary duty transformation theory of directors and curb the opportunistic tendencies of directors,it is unreasonable request to directors to be endowed liability to apply for bankruptcy and to identify in a timely manner when the company has reached the threshold of bankruptcy.The latter not only conforms to the theory of directors fiduciary duty transformation,but also has the institutional advantages,such as giving directors more options,more reasonable consideration of the existence of business risks and more suitable for China s bankruptcy ability.In one word,director s improper transaction liability mode is the appropriate rule pattern for China to construct the relevant system.

关 键 词：破产临界 不当交易责任 破产申请迟延责任 信义义务 

分 类 号：D922.291.92[政治法律—经济法学]