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作 者:黄苒[1] 胡丽琴 李梦圆 Huang Ran;Hu Liqin;Li Mengyuan(School of Economics and Business Administration,Central China Normal University,Wuhan 430079,China)
机构地区:[1]华中师范大学经济与工商管理学院,湖北武汉430079
出 处:《中国管理科学》2024年第9期11-23,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science
基 金:国家自然科学基金面上项目(72171100);教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(18YJA790037)。
摘 要:本文聚焦一个上、下游均包括多个生产型企业的供应链,探究了上游企业专有关系投资决策对其违约风险的影响。通过对上游企业生产决策和下游客户需求决策进行建模推演,对上游企业专有关系投资和收益流变化进行结构化分析,提出了基于收益流的违约风险测度方法。在不同市场环境和竞争环境下,围绕专有关系投资决策及双方议价力变化对上游企业违约风险的影响展开数值模拟分析,研究结果显示:不同价格水平下,上游企业的专有关系投资总能改善其收益和降低违约风险;随着上游企业产出品替代弹性增加,其议价力下降,专有关系投资对企业收益改善作用随之减弱,但仍能显著降低企业违约风险;若产出品替代率较低,竞争企业数量上升会增强企业议价力,专有关系投资因而能显著提升企业收益、降低违约风险;若产出品替代率较高,竞争企业数量增加会削弱企业议价力,专有关系投资对企业收益的改善作用逐渐消失,但仍有助于降低违约风险。此外,上游企业间的竞争水平还能引起客户议价力的变化,进而影响上游企业盈利水平和违约风险。A supply chain is typically characterized by mutual benefit and risk sharing based on member coordination and the integration of material flow,fund flow,and information flow.Engaging in supply chain cooperation may have an impact on firms in both positive and negative ways.Many empirical studies explore the effects of various supply chain characteristics on a firm’s default risk;however,few of them have investigated the relationship between relationship-specific investment(RSI),bargaining power,and a firm’s default risk.RSI could intensify the supply-chain relationship,decrease production and operation costs,and increase the profit of the whole chain.Nevertheless,bargaining power determines which party takes more profits and which party takes more risks.Firms with little bargaining power only get a small share,but even so,they must commit to RSI.In this circumstance,they will suffer a high lock-in risk of RSI and face more uncertainties in cash flow management.Accordingly,their profit margin may fall over time,capital turnover may slow down,and default risk may increase to a relatively higher level.It focuses on a supply chain with N upstream firms and M downstream customers and a structural framework is built to study the impact of a supplier firm’s RSI on its debt default risk.It first models the supply decision of upstream firms,the demand decision of downstream customers,and a supplier firms’optimal RSI decision.It also defines an upstream firm’s bargaining power as its capacity to get the RSI-induced surplus,and a customer’s bargaining power as its capacity to force upstream firms to reduce the basic price.Then,it estimates a supplier firm’s equilibrium profit and develops a profit-flow-based structural approach to quantify its debt default risk.Finally,it makes numerical simulations in different market environments and alternative competitive scenarios and evaluates the influence of a supplier firm’s optimal RSI and the bargaining powers of both parties on its profit flow and debt default ri
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