零售平台自有品牌与制造商渠道策略的竞合博弈分析  

Co-opetition Game Analysis Between Store Brand Strategy of Platform and Selling Channel Strategy of Manufacturer

作　　者：王鹏 王要玉 王建才[2] Wang Peng;Wang Yaoyu;Wang Jiancai(Business School,Soochow University,Suzhou 215021,China;School of Management and Economics,Beijing Institute of Technology,Beijing 100081,China)

机构地区：[1]苏州大学商学院,江苏苏州215021 [2]北京理工大学管理与经济学院,北京100081

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第9期214-224,共11页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(72371180,72071137,71871024);江苏省“333高层次人才培养工层”项目;江苏省研究生科研与实践创新计划项目(KYCX21_2923)。

摘　　要：针对品牌竞争和渠道竞争引发的利益冲突问题,考虑了零售平台是否引入自有品牌以及制造商的三种渠道策略,并基于消费者的品牌偏好与渠道偏好,构建了两阶段的Stackelberg博弈模型,进而分析双方在竞合博弈中策略交互行为。结果表明:零售平台的自有品牌策略依赖于产品采购成本和制造商的渠道策略;面对自有品牌竞争,制造商仅选择零售平台销售产品,但较高的佣金率可能会损害零售平台的利润;平台中无自有品牌且直销渠道建设成本较低时,制造商有动机实施双渠道策略,但差异化的渠道零售价格不一定对制造商有利;尽管制造商的策略选择先动优势导致了囚徒困境问题,但消费者较高的自有品牌偏好改善了双方的利润。With the increasing willingness of consumers to shop online,a growing number of retail platforms not only serve as service providers to operate an agency channel,but also sell competing store brands through their own platforms.At the same time,many manufacturers who used to sell national brands through the retail platform have also established direct online channel to sell the products.As a result,there is not only brand competition between the manufacturer and the retail platform but also selling channel competition between the direct online channel and the platform’s online channel.Therefore,two strategies of the retail platform are considered:introducing store brand and non-introducing store brand.Given the platform’s strategy,the manufacturer has three channel strategies:selling products through the retail platform,selling products through the online direct channel,and selling products through the dual channels.Combining with consumers’willingness to pay for different selling channels and brands,two-stage game models are constructed in different strategy scenarios.The games are solved by backward induction and equilibrium selling prices and profits are obtained.The optimal strategies of both players can be identifiedby comparing and analyzing these equilibrium outcomes.The results suggest that when the unit purchasing cost of the store brand is low,the platform has an incentive to introduce thebrand and can obtain higher revenues by charging commission feesfrom manufacturer and selling store brand products.However,a higher commission rate may hurt its profit.Even if the online platform introduces the competing store brand,themanufacturer sells national brand product through the platform only,and the selling price and market demand of the national brand are both higher.However,when there is no store brand on the platformand the channel establishment cost is low,the manufacturer sells national brands through dual channels.Nevertheless,it is worth noting that the manufacturer’s profit will be worseas the

关 键 词：竞合博弈 零售平台 制造商品牌 囚徒困境 

分 类 号：F224[经济管理—国民经济] F284