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作 者:葛泽慧[1,2] 袁夏莉 曹嘉宁 GE Zehui;YUAN Xiali;CAO Jianing(School of Economics and Management,University of Science and Technology Beijing,Beijing 100083,China;Beijing Enterprise Low-Carbon Operation Strategy Research Base,Beijing 100083,China)
机构地区:[1]北京科技大学经济管理学院,北京100083 [2]北京企业低碳运营战略研究基地,北京100083
出 处:《工业工程》2024年第5期126-137,共12页Industrial Engineering Journal
基 金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71871016,71871017)。
摘 要:针对消费电子行业需求不确定导致下游对新产品订货疲软的问题,本文在风险中性制造商和风险规避零售商之间设计了看跌期权契约,同时考虑服务水平约束的限制。通过比较以探讨看跌期权契约是否能激励风险规避零售商增加订货,并分析了零售商风险规避系数、服务水平约束和看跌期权契约参数对零售商决策和相关成员利润的影响。结果发现:零售商风险规避程度的增加会抑制其最优初始订单量的增加,但对制造商的期望利润存在正面影响;高服务水平有利于增加零售商的最优初始订单量和制造商的期望利润,但不利于增大零售商的最大条件风险值;看跌期权契约的存在对供应链成员均有好处。In order to solve the problem of weak downstream orders for new products caused by uncertain demand in the consumer electronics industry,this paper designs a put option contract between a risk-neutral manufacturer and a risk-averse retailer,considering service level constraints.By comparison,this paper discusses whether the put option contract can motivate the risk-averse retailer to increase orders,and analyzes the effects of the retailer's risk aversion coefficient,service level constraints and put option contract parameters on retailer decisions and the profit of related members.Results show that an increase in the retailer's risk aversion level may inhibit the increase in the optimal initial order quantity,but has a positive impact on the manufacturer's expected profit.High service levels are beneficial to increasing the retailer's optimal initial order quantity and the manufacturer's expected profit,but not to increasing the retailer's maximum conditional risk value.The existence of put option contract is beneficial to all supply chain members.
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