盟国会参与美国的军事干涉吗?——领导人、同盟义务与参与选择  

Will Allies Participate in U.S.Military Intervention?-Leaders,Allied Obligations,and Participation Options

作　　者：梁佩锋 漆海霞[2] Liang Peifeng;Qi Haixia

机构地区：[1]清华大学公共管理学院 [2]清华大学国际关系学系

出　　处：《拉丁美洲研究》2024年第5期2-33,162,163,共34页Journal of Latin American Studies

摘　　要：二战后美国的海外军事干涉在行动上呈现多边主义特征,积极招揽包括盟国、安全伙伴、所干涉地区国家等其他国家,组建临时的军事联合阵线开展军事干涉。以往研究认为正式同盟义务对该国选择是否参与美国领导的多国联合军事干涉起重要作用,但是由于美国的对外干涉超出了联盟条约的防御义务,盟国也并不一定都会参与美国的联合阵线。本文从美国盟友选择性参与美国的多国联合军事干涉现象出发,研究盟国参与美国领导的军事干涉联合阵线的动因与理论机制。本文基于对军事干涉与联合阵线的文献回顾,运用成本收益分析、冲突转移理论与武力使用偏好分析,从领导人个人层面因素提出领导人任期限制与鹰派倾向影响盟国领导人做出参与美国领导的军事干涉决策的假设。通过对二战后美国领导的八次军事干涉联合阵线中56个盟国的参与情况进行实证分析,发现领导人任期限制因素对于盟国参与联合阵线有显著的抑制作用;盟国领导人在做出联合阵线参与决策的过程中,主要基于制度约束下对个人任期限制的理性考量,较少为其武力使用偏好所左右。Since the Second World War,the United States has actively built coalitions for military intervention that include US allies,security partners,and states in the same region where the intervention was initiated.Previous studies have suggested that formal alliances play an important role in the formation of US-led military coalitions.However,since military support for US overseas military interference goes beyond the defence commitments made in the alliance treaty,US allies may also refuse to join a US-led military interference coalition.Why do US allies choose to participate in US-led military interference coalitions?This research seeks to clarify the dynamics and mechanism of US allies'choice of coalition participation.Many previous studies on the dynamics of participation in military coalitions have mainly focused on factors related to the relationship between the leading country and the participating countries.However,these factors ultimately play an important role in influencing the decision-making process of the leaders of the participating countries.This study pays close attention to the factors related to leaders.After analysing the theoretical mechanism on the basis of cost-benefit analysis,diversionary conflict theory and leaders'preference for the use of force,this study proposes theoretical expectations that leaders'term limits and hawkish preferences affect leaders'willingness to participate in military interference coalition.To statistically test the hypotheses,the article builds a binary logit panel model using data from 56 post-World War II US allies and 8 military interference coalitions.The empirical result shows that leaders of US allies with term limits are less likely to participate in US-led coalitions,while the result of leaders'hawkish preference rejects the hypothesis.Unexpectedly,factors related to the relationship between the leading country and the participating countries have an insignificant effect on allies'participation in military intervention coalition.Specifically,when considering

关 键 词：军事干涉 联合阵线 盟国 任期限制 鹰派倾向 

分 类 号：F113[经济管理—国际贸易]