基于语言个体主义对信念之谜的探究  

A Study of Puzzle about Belief Based on Linguistic Individualism

作　　者：郭立东[1] Lidong Guo

机构地区：[1]四川大学哲学系

出　　处：《逻辑学研究》2024年第5期95-111,共17页Studies in Logic

摘　　要：克里普克给出例子,试图表明有可能(i)一个理性的人认为自己的语言中一个专名有歧义,并且(ii)这个专名实际上没有歧义。因而这个人可能赞同一对表达矛盾命题的语句。使用去引号原则和矛盾从句原则,就可以将矛盾的信念归属给他,从而产生信念之谜。这种假设是基于常识性语言概念。而在语言个体主义看来,(i)和(ii)不能同时为真。运用个人语言中名称使用的同义性标准进行分析,可以得出克里普克的例子中,相信者和信念报告者的个人语言不同,因而去引号原则的使用不合法,信念之谜被消解。Kripke has given an example,attempting to show that it is possible(i)that a rational person thinks that a proper name in his language is ambiguous,and(ii)that this proper name is actually unambiguous.By using the disquotational principle and the Principle of Contradictory Thatclauses,we can attribute contradictory beliefs to him,thus giving rise to the puzzle about belief.This assumption is based on the commonsense notion of language.From the perspective of linguistic individualism,(i)and(ii)cannot be true at the same time.By applying the criteria for the Synonymy of Uses of Names in Idiolect to analyze,it can be concluded that in Kripke’s example,the idiolect of believer is different from the idiolect of belief reporter,therefore,the application of the disquotational principle is illegal.Then,the puzzle about belief is resolved.

关 键 词：专名 信念之谜 去引号原则 个人语言 语言个体主义 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]