审计质量会抑制“漂绿”行为吗?——基于企业声誉的视角  

Can Audit Quality Suppress“Greenwashing”Behavior?:Based on the Perspective of Corporate Reputation

作　　者：杨芳[1] 张和平 孙晴晴 刘禹轩 YANG Fang;ZHANG Heping;SUN Qingqing;LIU Yuxuan(School of Economics and Management,Yunnan Minzu University,Kunming 650504,China)

机构地区：[1]云南民族大学经济与管理学院(会计学院),昆明650504

出　　处：《科技和产业》2024年第21期47-54,共8页Science Technology and Industry

摘　　要：审计作为一种外部监督方式,可以降低融资约束和代理成本,提高内部控制有效性,提高企业绩效和声誉,降低企业内部风险。审计监管或将成为抑制“漂绿”行为的重要手段。以2015—2020年重污染A股上市企业为研究对象,基于信息不对称理论和内部控制理论,从审计质量视角出发,研究其对企业“漂绿”行为的影响及作用机制。研究发现,审计质量对“漂绿”行为存在显著的抑制效应。机制分析表明,审计质量可以通过提高企业声誉来抑制“漂绿”行为。异质性分析表明,在媒体关注度较高、经营风险较低、数字化转型程度较高的企业,审计质量对企业“漂绿”行为的抑制效果更好。因此,在推动绿色金融平稳运行的过程中,应加强审计监督,处理好绿色低碳转型过程中的“漂绿”风险,督促企业落实绿色发展理念。As an external supervision method,audit can reduce financing constraints and agency costs,improve the effectiveness of internal control,enhance corporate performance and reputation,and reduce internal risks.Audit supervision may become an important means to curb greenwashing behavior.Taking heavily polluting A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2020 as the research object,based on information asymmetry theory and internal control theory,their impact and mechanism on corporate“greenwashing”behavior are investigated from the perspective of audit quality.It is found that audit quality has a significant inhibitory effect on“greenwashing”behavior.Mechanism analysis shows that audit quality can suppress“greenwashing”behavior by improving corporate reputation.Heterogeneity analysis shows that in enterprises with high media attention,low operational risk,and high degree of digital transformation,audit quality has a better inhibitory effect on corporate“greenwashing”behavior.Therefore,in the process of promoting the smooth operation of green finance,it is necessary to strengthen audit supervision,handle the risk of“greenwashing”in the process of green and low-carbon transformation,and urge enterprises to implement the concept of green development.

关 键 词：审计质量 漂绿 企业声誉 信息不对称 绿色发展 

分 类 号：F239[经济管理—会计学]