村集体干预对农户农地流转合约选择的影响  

The impact of village collective intervention on farmers’choice of farmland transfer contracts

作　　者：马亚飞 谢小飞 高芸芸 吕剑平 MA Yafei;XIE Xiaofei;GAO Yunyun;LV Jianping(College of Economics&Management,South China Agricultural University,Guangzhou 510642,China;College of Finance and Economics,Gansu Agricultural University,Lanzhou 730070,China)

机构地区：[1]华南农业大学经济管理学院,广东广州510642 [2]甘肃农业大学财经学院,甘肃兰州730070

出　　处：《湖南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》2024年第6期12-20,共9页Journal of Hunan Agricultural University(Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(19XSH021);甘肃省哲学社会科学规划项目(2022QN016,2023YB035)。

摘　　要：农村非正式农地流转合约流行,导致农地流转市场价格机制失灵。本文从交易成本和信息不对称视角阐述了村集体干预与农户农地流转合约选择的关系,然后基于2017年中国农村家庭追踪调查(CRHPS)数据,实证检验了村集体干预对农户农地流转合约选择的影响及其作用机制。结果表明:村集体干预能够显著提高农户对书面合约的选择,该结论经过内生性分析和稳健性检验后仍然成立;村集体干预主要通过降低农地流转交易成本和缓解农地流转信息不对称两个渠道促进了农户对书面合约的选择。The prevalence of informal farmland transfer contracts in rural areas leads to the ineffectiveness of the market price mechanism of farmland transfer.The relationship between village collective intervention and farmers’choice of farmland transfer contracts was elaborated from the perspectives of transaction cost and information asymmetry.Meanwhile,based on the data of the 2017 China Rural Household Panel Survey(CRHPS),the impact of village collective intervention on farmers’choice of farmland transfer contracts and its mechanism were examined empirically.The results show that village collective intervention can significantly increase farmers’choice of written contracts,and the conclusion is still the same after endogenetic analysis and robustness tests.Village collective intervention promotes farmers’choice of written contracts mainly through two channels:reducing the cost of farmland transfer transaction and alleviating the information asymmetry of farmland transfer.

关 键 词：村集体干预 农地流转 合约选择 交易成本 信息不对称 

分 类 号：F321.1[经济管理—产业经济]