政策激励与信息质量:容错纠错机制对国有企业前瞻性信息披露的影响  

Policy Incentives and Information Quality: The Impact of Error Tolerance and Correction Mechanismson State-Owned Enterprises’ Forward-Looking Information Disclosure

作　　者：罗兵 杨妮 LUO Bing;YANG Ni(School of Accounting,Guizhou University of Commerce,Guiyang,Guizhou 550014,China)

机构地区：[1]贵州商学院会计学院,贵州贵阳550014

出　　处：《贵州财经大学学报》2024年第6期57-67,共11页Journal of Guizhou University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：2019国家社会科学基金一般项目“基于‘管资本’的国有企业出资者财务体系研究”(19BGL062)。

摘　　要：基于2011至2021年A股国有上市企业研究样本,采取文本分析和实证检验方法,研究发现国有企业实施容错纠错机制试点显著提高了企业前瞻性信息披露水平。进一步分析发现,容错纠错机制通过提升企业风险行为决策和信息披露决策层面的风险承担能力,促进前瞻性信息披露。混合所有制改革和国资监管体系改革与容错纠错机制结合,产生政策协同效应,进一步促进了国企前瞻性信息披露。此外,经济后果检验显示,容错纠错政策激励下,企业倾向于披露更高质量前瞻性信息,降低信息不对称,进而降低国企资本成本。同时,这种信息披露真实反映了国企潜力和前景,增强了企业未来价值创造和转型能力。Adopting textual analysis and empirical tests on A-share SOEs from 2011 to 2021,it's found that fault-tolerance pilots by these enterprises notably enhance forward-looking information disclosure.The mechanism is shown to boost this disclosure by increasing risk-taking in decision-making processes.Combined with mixed-ownership reform and state-asset supervision reforms,these policies create synergies that further advance SOE disclosure.Economic consequence tests reveal that fault-tolerance policies motivate the disclosure of higher-quality forward-looking information,reducing information asymmetry and lowering SOE capital costs,while authentically reflecting their growth potential and strengthening future value creation and transformation capabilities.

关 键 词：容错纠错机制 前瞻性信息披露 国企改革 

分 类 号：F230[经济管理—会计学]