跨界竞争中平台企业的定价策略研究  

Pricing Strategy of Platform Cross-market Competition

作　　者：乔岳[1] 余文诗 Qiao Yue;Yu Wenshi(School of Innovation and Entrepreneurship,Shandong University,Qingdao 266237;School of Economics,Shandong University,Jinan 250100)

机构地区：[1]山东大学国际创新转化学院,青岛266237 [2]山东大学经济学院,济南250100

出　　处：《管理评论》2024年第9期3-13,共11页Management Review

基　　金：山东省自然科学基金面上项目(ZR2023MG030)。

摘　　要：在数字经济时代,跨界经营是平台企业进行业务拓展的常见方式。本文基于平台企业跨界竞争的基本情形构建了一个双边市场多阶段博弈模型,研究当存在跨市场网络效应时平台企业进行业务拓展的最优定价策略,并分析跨市场网络效应和交叉网络外部性对平台企业的影响。研究发现:跨界平台对新市场两边用户总能收取正的价格,对原市场两边用户是收费还是补贴依赖于跨市场网络效应的大小;随着跨市场网络效应的增大,跨界平台在原市场的利润减少,在新市场的利润和总利润都增大;当跨市场网络效应较大时,跨界平台在原市场上利润为负,但是总利润为正,并且大于其竞争对手的利润。本文为研究平台企业的定价策略提供了新的视角。In the age of the digital economy,cross-market operation is a common way for platform enterprises to expand their business.In the context of cross-market competition,this paper constructs a multi-stage game model in a two-sided market to study the optimal pricing strategy of platform enterprises when a cross-market network effect exists,and analyzes the influences of cross-market network effect and cross network externality on platforms.The findings are as follows.The cross-market platform can always charge positive prices to users on both sides in the new market,but whether they charge or subsidize users in the original market depends on the size of the cross-market network effect.With the increase of the cross-market network effect,the profit in the original market of the cross-market platform decreases,while the profit in the new market and total profit increase accordingly.When the cross-market network effect is large,the profit of the cross-market platform in the original market is negative.Still,the total profit is positive and the total profit is greater than that of its competitors.This paper can provide a new perspective for studying the pricing strategies of platforms.

关 键 词：平台企业 交叉网络外部性 跨市场网络效应 跨界竞争 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F274