中小投资者知情权保护与资产误定价  

Protection of Minority Shareholders’Right to Information and Asset Mispricing

作　　者：孙浩然 谢雁翔 马连福[1,2] 门峰 Sun Haoran;Xie Yanxiang;Ma Lianfu;Men Feng

机构地区：[1]南开大学商学院,天津300071 [2]南开大学中国公司治理研究院,天津300071 [3]中国汽车技术研究中心有限公司,天津300399

出　　处：《证券市场导报》2024年第11期71-79,共9页Securities Market Herald

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目“股东网络特征与投资决策权配置研究”(项目编号:71772094);国家自然科学基金面上项目“数字化时代背景下控制权配置与公司价值研究”(项目编号:7217020212)。

摘　　要：本文以2010—2023年沪深A股上市公司为样本,通过上市公司差异性互动测度中小投资者知情权保护水平,探究其对资产误定价的影响。研究发现,投资者差异性互动显著提升了资产误定价程度,且主要表现为股价高估,信息不对称与投资者非理性情绪是作用机制,这表明缺乏中小投资者知情权保护会增加资产误定价。进一步研究发现,意见交流能力、关注度和互动规模等中小投资者特征显著影响投资者差异性互动与资产误定价的关系。投资者差异性互动引发的资产误定价会损害正常融资活动与市场经营效率。研究结论对规范互动式信息披露和维护资本市场健康发展具有重要启示。This paper uses the A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges as a sample to measure the protection level of minority shareholders’right to information in the differentiated interaction of listed companies and explores its influence on asset mispricing.The research finds that the investor differentiated interaction significantly increases the degree of asset mispricing,primarily manifesting as overestimation.The mechanisms behind this are information asymmetry and irrational investor sentiment,suggesting that a lack of protection for minority shareholders’right to information leads to an increase in asset mispricing.Further research shows that the characteristics of minority shareholders,such as communication ability,attention,and interaction scale,significantly influence this relationship.The asset mispricing caused by investor differentiated interaction will damage normal financing activities and market operation efficiency.The research conclusion has important insights for regulating interactive information disclosure and maintaining the healthy development of the capital market.

关 键 词：中小投资者 知情权保护 投资者差异性互动 资产误定价 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]