队列中的信息异构:基于口碑传播的等待制服务系统定价决策  

Information Heterogeneity in a Queue:Pricing Decision in Waiting Service Systems with Word-of-mouth

作　　者：姜涛 高丽 刘露 柴旭东 Jiang Tao;Gao Li;Liu Lu;Chai Xudong(College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China;School of Mathematics-Physics and Finance,Anhui Polytechnic University,Wuhu 241000,China)

机构地区：[1]山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东青岛266590 [2]安徽工程大学数理与金融学院,安徽芜湖241000

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第10期123-132,共10页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(12001329,71902105);山东省自然科学基金项目(ZR2019BG014);安徽工程大学人才引进科研启动基金项目(2022YQQ026);山东科技大学人才引进科研启动基金项目(2019RCJJ016)。

摘　　要：随着现代服务业的快速发展,顾客获取服务信息的渠道变得愈发多样,因此,他们对服务信息的掌握程度是不同的,即顾客获取服务信息具有异质性。本文考虑了一种包含会员顾客和非会员顾客的等待制服务系统,两类顾客获取的服务信息是异质的,其中会员顾客能够获得充分的服务信息并做出理性决策,而非会员顾客没有相关的服务信息,为避免盲目决策,他们主动搜寻口碑传播,通过接收口碑信息来估测服务效用进而做出选择。首先,本文充分描述了会员顾客的均衡策略行为,并研究非会员顾客获取服务评级反馈信息数量对会员顾客排队行为的影响。然后建构服务提供商的收益函数,得出服务提供商最优服务定价。研究发现,较小的会员顾客市场规模可能会导致服务提供商较高的最优定价。此外,当会员顾客的市场规模超过某一特定值,并且服务会员顾客的服务速率大于非会员顾客时,那么,随着非会员顾客获得的服务价值评级反馈信息数量的增大,综合评级高(低)的提供商应该降低(提升)服务定价,反之亦然。In today's information service society,there are various channels for customers to obtain service information.On one hand,some customers can easily grasp service information and make rational decisions according to relevant service information.On the other hand,due to the influence of various factors,it is difficult for some customers to obtain service information.In order to avoid blind decision,they can use the word of mouth(WOM)information to confirm whether they can trust such service,that is,WOM information can provide more reliable guarantee for their decision making.On the basis of this phenomenon,in this paper,it aims to deal with the related following questions:Q1.When the queue information obtained is heterogeneous,how do the two types of delay-sensitive customers make their own queuing decisions,how do the decisions of non-member customers affect the member customers’equilibrium queuing strategies?Q2.As the market size of member customers changes,how should the service provider make the optimal pricing decision to maximize his revenue without changing service capacity?Q3.As non-member customers collect more WOM information,how should the service provider adjust the optimal service price?To address these research questions,this paper considers a non-preemptive M/M/1 priority queuing model,which includes two types of customers,namely,member and non-member customers.The service information obtained by the two types of customers is heterogeneous,where member customers can obtain sufficient service-related information and make rational decisions,while non-member customers have no relevant service information and can only rely on WOM ways to make decisions,such as interpersonal channels or service rating websites,that is,they can obtain relevant experience information from relatives and friends who have purchased service,or use review websites to collect relevant rating information on the service value to know the service.The equilibrium strategic behavior of member customers is described and the influence

关 键 词：信息异质性 口碑信息 等待制服务系统 服务定价 优化 

分 类 号：F224.34[经济管理—国民经济] O226[理学—运筹学与控制论]