不确定性条件下航空公司航线网络选择的动态博弈  

Dynamic Game of Airline Network Selection under Uncertain Conditions

作　　者：景崇毅[1] 郭韩一萌 卢燕 吴孟瑶 Jing Chongyi;Guo Hanyimeng;Lu Yan;Wu Mengyao(Economics and Management School,Civil Aviation Flight University of China,Guanghan 618307,China)

机构地区：[1]中国民用航空飞行学院经济与管理学院/机场管理与工程研究中心,四川广汉618307

出　　处：《中国管理科学》2024年第10期133-145,共13页Chinese Journal of Management Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(U2033213);民航局教育人才类项目(MJ-2023009);四川省哲学社会科学项目(SCJJ23ND440)。

摘　　要：航线网络不仅是航空公司重要的战略资源,还是国家重点建设的基础设施,网络模式的选择和构建会影响民航行业的运行效率和质量。本文构建了一个航空公司网络选择的三阶段非合作博弈模型,利用Stackelberg动态博弈理论进行逆推求解,并深入探讨了博弈均衡的不确定性效应、成本效应及市场规模效应。研究发现:第一,市场不确定性为枢纽网络提供了巨大的灵活性价值,但竞争会对其造成一定程度的损耗。当不确定性程度超过一定界限时,新进入者倾向于采用枢纽网络。第二,在本地市场对称性的假设下,本地市场规模不会影响网络博弈的均衡结果。当中转市场足够大时,即使市场具有较强的不确定性,新进入者仍然倾向于采用点对点网络。第三,新进入者的最佳网络决策实质上是在灵活性价值和成本优势之间进行权衡。当单位运力成本较低时,新进入者倾向于获取灵活性价值,当单位运力成本较高时,新进入者会采取差异化的网络策略,此时两家公司分别享有灵活性价值和成本优势,在大多数情形下,这种均衡状态往往是社会最优的。文章在最后对理论结果进行数值模拟,并给出了相应的管理启示。The airline network is not only an important strategic resource for airlines,but also a key national infrastructure.The choice and construction of the network model will affect the operational efficiency and quality of the civil aviation industry.A three-stage non-cooperative game model for airline network selection is constructed.If the airline i adopts the hub-and-spoke network,the second-stage capacity game model and the third-stage quantitative game model are:Π_(i)=max(Eπ_(i)-2c_(h)n_(i)K_(i))、πi=maxΣ_(y=1)2 yq_(yi)[My-(q_(yi)+q_(yj))].If the airlineiadopts the point-to-point network,the second-stage capacity game model and the third-stage quantitative game model are:Πi=max(Eπ_(i)-c_(p)Σy=12 yq_(yi))、π_(i)=maxΣy=12 yq_(yi)[M_(y)-(q_(yi)+q_(yj))],whereΠ_(i)andπ_(i)represent the profits of the second stage capacity game and the third stage quantity game respectively.Based on the three hypotheses in this paper,the Stackelberg dynamic game theory is used to solve the problem,and the uncertainty effect,cost effect and market scale effect of game equilibrium are discussed deeply.It is found that:firstly,market uncertainty provides great flexibility value for the hub-and-spoke network,but competition will cause a certain degree of loss to it.When the degree of uncertainty exceeds a certain limit,new entrants tend to adopt the hub-and-spoke network.Secondly,under the assumption of the symmetry of the local market,the size of the local market will not affect the equilibrium result of the network game.When the connecting market scale is large enough,even if the market has strong uncertainty,new entrants still tend to use point-to-point networks.Thirdly,the best network decision for new entrants is essentially a tradeoff between the value of flexibility and cost advantage.When the unit capacity cost is low,the new entrants tend to obtain the flexibility value,when the unit capacity cost is high,the new entrants will adopt different network strategies,and the two companies enjoy flexibility value and cost

关 键 词：航空公司 航线网络结构 动态博弈 市场不确定 灵活性价值 

分 类 号：U8[交通运输工程]