府会政治对美国全球经济治理策略的影响研究  

A Study of the Impact of the Government-congress Politics on Global Economic Governance Strategy of the United States

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作  者:张尊月 任琳[2] ZHANG Zunyue;REN Lin

机构地区:[1]中国社会科学院大学国际政治经济学院 [2]中国社会科学院世界经济与政治研究所全球治理研究室

出  处:《国际经贸探索》2024年第10期89-106,共18页International Economics and Trade Research

基  金:中国社会科学院重大创新项目(2023YZD025)。

摘  要:随着民粹主义、孤立主义等思潮在美国的兴起与加剧,美国国内外事务间的界限日益模糊。在两党政治高度极化的背景下,府会权力结构深刻影响着美国的全球经济治理策略。共和党执政时偏好针对关键国际事务加强国内立法,通过将国内法案国际化的方式来遏制他国;而民主党执政时则偏好使用国际制度达成全球经济治理目标,通过国际制度实现“规锁”他国的目的。府会之间的党派一致性越大,执政党实施与自身偏好一致的全球治理手段所受到的阻碍就越小。虽然在不同的府会结构之下,美国参与全球经济治理的手段存在一定差异,但本质上都是为了达到维护美国霸权的目的。With the rise and intensification of populism and isolationism in the United States,the boundary between domestic and foreign affairs of the United States is becoming increasingly blurred.Against the backdrop of highly polarized bipartisan politics,the power structure of the government and the congress has a profound impact on global economic governance strategy of the United States.When the Republican Party is in power,it prefers to strengthen domestic legislation on key international affairs and contain other countries by internationalizing domestic bills;when the Democratic Party is in power,it prefers to adopt international institution to achieve the goal of global economic governance and the goal of “confining” other countries.The greater the party consistency between the government and the congress is,the less obstacles the ruling party faces in implementing global governance measures that align with its own preferences.Although there are certain differences in the means by which the United States participates in global economic governance under different government-congress structures,they are all essentially aimed at maintaining the hegemony of the United States.

关 键 词:全球经济治理 国际制度 国内法案 美国政治 党派政治 

分 类 号:F744[经济管理—国际贸易] D815[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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