修昔底德陷阱:正式博弈模型与案例分析  

Thucydides Trap:A Formal Game Model and Case Analysis

作　　者：姚东旻 张鹏远 王子豪 YAO Dongmin;ZHANG Pengyuan;WANG Zihao(Center for China Fiscal Development,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 102206,China;School of Public Finance and Taxation,Hebei University of Economics and Business,Shijiazhuang 050061,Hebei)

机构地区：[1]中央财经大学中国财政发展协同创新中心,北京102206 [2]河北经贸大学财政税务学院,河北石家庄050061

出　　处：《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2024年第6期128-140,共13页Journal of Xiamen University(A Bimonthly for Studies in Arts & Social Sciences)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目“政府预决算视角下提升我国国家创新体系整体效能的财政体制与政策研究”(20AJY020);北京市教委高精尖学科战略经济与军民融合“国家战略博弈与国家安全(军民融合)经费研究”(024059320008)。

摘　　要：修昔底德陷阱被广泛应用于解释崛起国与主导国之间的国家关系,但现有文献在修昔底德陷阱的含义、机制、应用等方面并未达成一致,其原因可能是缺乏一个清晰明确的数理模型刻画。通过构建一个包含崛起国与主导国的完全信息动态博弈模型,模型的子博弈完美纳什均衡(SPNE)结果表明修昔底德陷阱中崛起国与主导国“注定一战”的论断未必成立。研究发现,崛起国与主导国的国内投入是影响两国趋向或远离“绝对和平”均衡的关键因素,二战前后的美日关系演变支持了模型结论。而且,崛起国与主导国的国内投入是国防投入的影响因素之一,冷战期间20世纪70年代的美苏军费变化情况支持了模型相关命题。2010年以来中美关系和军费的变化也支持了理论模型的相关结论。The Thucydides Trap has been widely utilized to analyze the dynamics of international relations between rising powers and ruling powers.However,existing literature lacks consensus on its meaning,mechanisms and applications,potentially due to the absence of a clear mathematical model to characterize the phenomenon.This study addresses this gap by constructing and solving a complete information dynamic game model that incorporates both the rising and ruling powers.The findings challenge the notion that conflict is inevitable between the two,suggesting instead that the domestic inputs of both powers significantly influence whether they trend toward or away from an"absolute peace"equilibrium.The research draws upon historicalevidence,particularly the evolution of US-Japan relations before and after World War II,to support the model's conclusions.Additionally,the study introduces the concept of defense expenditure as a critical variable,positing that domestic inputs plays a pivotal role in shaping military spending.This assertion is further substantiated through an analysis of US-Soviet military expenditures during the 1970s Cold War,which aligns with the model's predictions.Finally,an examination of Sino-American relations since 2010 reveals that fluctuations in the relationship and corresponding military expenditures provide additional support for the theoretical model's conclusions.

关 键 词：修昔底德陷阱 大国竞争 国防投入 中美关系 

分 类 号：D81[政治法律—国际关系]