短期信贷与银企双向寻租:存在证据与形成机制  

Short-term Credit and Bidirectional Rent-seeking between Banks and Firms:Evidence and Formation Mechanism

作　　者：李惠竹 王振山[1] 刘井建[2] LI Huizhu;WANG Zhenshan;LIU Jingjian(School of Finance,Dongbei University of Finance and Economics;School of Economics and Management,Dalian University of Technology)

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学金融学院,116025 [2]大连理工大学经济管理学院,116024

出　　处：《经济研究》2024年第9期23-41,共19页Economic Research Journal

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(21BGL080)的资助。

摘　　要：本文基于我国非金融企业债务短期化的融资异象,深入剖析信贷参与双方的利益诉求和关系特征,从银企双向寻租的视角探讨企业短期信贷蕴含的租金成本。针对我国2008—2023年沪深A股上市公司的实证研究发现,短期信贷配置产生了超额手续费和招待差旅费,从供需两端形成了包括银行租和企业租在内的双重租金成本。本文利用产业政策和资管新规的外生政策冲击检验,以及与房价相关联的企业抵押品价值的工具变量分析,验证了结论的可靠性。渠道机制分析表明,在银行租方面,短期信贷强化了商业银行融资主导地位以及信息独占优势,进而催生了垄断租金和信息租金;在企业租方面,短期信贷加剧了企业流动性风险而强化企业信贷寻租动机,最终形成了银企双向寻租行为。异质性分析发现,宏观层面的宽松货币政策和金融市场化以及微观企业的资产专用性和民营属性有助于抑制短期信贷寻租。后果检验发现,短期信贷寻租降低了企业资本投资效率和研发投资水平,产生了“绊脚石”效应。最后,短期信贷中银企寻租行为存在互动关系。本文的研究为优化企业融资结构、改善银企关系以及深化金融供给侧结构性改革提供了借鉴。Enhancing the quality and efficiency of financial services for the real economy is crucial for promoting highquality economic development.In China,commercial bank credit serves as the primary channel for corporate financing;however,banks opt to replace long-term loans with rolling short-term credit due to safety concerns.This preference has led to a significant accumulation of short-term interest-bearing liabilities among firms during their rapid expansion.However,the excessive allocation of short-term credit has exacerbated corporate maturity mismatches,significantly increased refinancing risks,and compressed the net interest margin of banks,leading to a divergence between banks’pursuit of profitability and maintenance of stability.In this context,it is essential to assess the interest conflicts and strategic behaviors of both banks and firms from an economically rational perspective.Such an analysis can provide theoretical foundations for advancing supply-side structural reform while establishing mechanisms that support real economic development.This study focuses on how banks and firms respond to interest conflicts in short-term credit through rent-seeking,specifically aiming to answer the following questions.From the perspective of banks,the repeated negotiation and frequent contracting characteristics of short-term credit grant banks greater flexibility in dynamically adjusting financial covenants.It raises a question about whether banks engage in rent-seeking in short-term credit,thereby forming“bank rents”.Concurrently,from the perspective of firms,short-term credit increases liquidity risk.Thus,do firms increase rent-seeking behaviors to strengthen their relationship with banks,thus forming“firm rents”?Furthermore,how do supply-side and demand-side characteristics affect bidirectional rent-seeking between banks and firms in short-term credit?Do these shortterm credit rent-seeking behaviors lead to efficiency losses?Taking non-financial listed companies in the Chinese A-share market from 2008 to

关 键 词：短期信贷 寻租 垄断租金 信息租金 流动性风险 

分 类 号：F832.4[经济管理—金融学] F832.51