公司控制权的规制变革与平衡进路  

Regulatory Changes and Balancing Approaches for Corporate Control

作　　者：汪青松[1] WANG Qingsong(Civil and Commercial Law School,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China)

机构地区：[1]西南政法大学民商法学院,重庆401120

出　　处：《现代法学》2024年第6期87-101,共15页Modern Law Science

基　　金：国家社科基金后期资助项目“国家出资公司中国特色治理机制研究”(23FFXB040)。

摘　　要：现代公司法高度重视股权保护,但股权保护之立法目的需要通过规制控制权的规则设计来达成。公司控制关系的普遍存在表明“控制性利益”可以构成一种隐性激励,控制关系对公司治理具有双面影响。传统立法对“控制性利益”谋取行为采取“强制禁止+事后追责”的规制策略是低效的,特别是欠缺积极的引导性规则,呈现出明显的制度失衡。新《公司法》展现出对公司控制进行平衡规制的取向,以立法目的之扩展调适公司法的制度功能,以股权配置多元化满足控制人的控制需求,以灵活的组织机构提升公司治理的实效性,以周延的问责机制保障控制行为的妥当性。未来应当进一步将控制从事实转变为权利,完善其识别规则与权能体系,明晰司法介入商业的限度以实现审慎科责,并注重运用程序性引导的规制策略。Modern company law regards shareholder’s right protection as its core legislative goal,but equity protection needs to be achieved through control regulations.The widespread existence of corporate control indicates that“control interests”constitute an implicit incentive,and control relationships have a dual impact on corporate governance.The traditional legislation that adopts a regulatory strategy of“mandatory prohibition and post accountability”for the pursuit of“control and personal gain”is inefficient.Especially due to the lack of positive guidance,there is a clear institutional imbalance.The new Company Law demonstrates the orientation of balancing and regulating corporate control,expanding and adjusting the institutional functions of the Company Law for legislative purposes,meeting the control needs of controllers through diversified equity allocation,enhancing the effectiveness of corporate governance through flexible organizational structures,and ensuring the appropriateness of control behavior through a comprehensive accountability mechanism.In the future,control should be further transformed from facts to rights,its identification rules and power system should be improved,the limits of judicial intervention in commerce should be clarified to achieve prudent accountability,and attention should be paid to the use of procedural regulatory strategies.

关 键 词：控制权 控股股东 实际控制人 控制性利益 

分 类 号：DF411.92[政治法律—经济法学]