Game theory attack pricing for mining pools in blockchain-based IoT  

作　　者：Yourong Chen Hao Chen Zhenyu Xiong Banteng Liu Zhangquan Wang Meng Han 

机构地区：[1]College of Information Science and Technology,Zhejiang Shuren University,Hangzhou,310015,China [2]College of Electronics and Information,Hangzhou Dianzi University,Hangzhou,310018,China [3]Binjiang Institute of Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,310053,China [4]Zhejiang Juntong Intelligence Co.Ltd,Hangzhou,310053,China [5]Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,310027,China [6]Viterbi School of Engineering,University of Southern California,Los Angeles,90089,USA

出　　处：《Digital Communications and Networks》2024年第4期973-988,共16页数字通信与网络（英文版）

基　　金：funded by the“Ling Yan”Research and Development Project of Science Technology Department of Zhejiang Province of China under Grants No.2022C03122;Public Welfare Technology Application and Research Projects of Science Technology Department of Zhejiang Province of China under Grants No.LGF22F020006 and LGF21F010004.

摘　　要：The malicious mining pool can sacrifice part of its revenue to employ the computing power of blockchain network.The employed computing power carries out the pool mining attacks on the attacked mining pool.To realize the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee,the paper proposes an Employment Attack Pricing Algorithm(EAPA)of mining pools in blockchain based on game theory.In the EAPA,the paper uses mathematical formulas to express the revenue of malicious mining pools under the employment attack,the revenue increment of malicious mining pools,and the revenue of the employee.It establishes a game model between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the employment attack.Then,the paper proposes an optimal computing power price selection strategy of employment attack based on model derivation.In the strategy,the malicious mining pool analyzes the conditions for the employment attack,and uses the derivative method to find the optimal utilization value of computing power,employees analyze the conditions for accepting employment,and use the derivative method to find the optimal reward value of computing power.Finally,the strategy finds the optimal employment computing power price to realize Nash equilibrium between the malicious mining pool and the employee under the current computing power allocation.The simulation results show that the EAPA could find the employment computing power price that realizes the win-win game between the malicious mining pool and the employee.The EAPA also maximizes the unit computing power revenue of employment and the unit computing power revenue of honest mining in malicious mining pool at the same time.The EAPA outperforms the state-of-the-art methods such as SPSUCP,DPSACP,and FPSUCP.

关 键 词：Game theory Blockchain PoW Mining pool Employment attack 

分 类 号：TP311.13[自动化与计算机技术—计算机软件与理论] TP309[自动化与计算机技术—计算机科学与技术]