中国数字平台企业存在“杀手并购”吗——特征事实、动因与后果分析  

Does Killer Acquisition Exist in Chinese Digital Platforms——Stylized Facts,Motivation and Consequences

作　　者：蒋墨冰 罗莲 吕品[1] JIANG Mobing;LUO Lian;LV Pin(School of Economics and Management,Zhejiang Sci-Tech University)

机构地区：[1]浙江理工大学经济管理学院,310018

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2024年第9期87-104,共18页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目“数字非竞争性视角下反垄断政策推进平台企业创新发展的机制与优化路径”(21CJL024)的资助。

摘　　要：中国数字平台头部企业凭借资本和市场优势大量并购初创企业,引起了监管部门和社会公众的普遍担忧。中国数字平台企业是否存在以消除潜在竞争为目的的“杀手并购”?本文以中国三大数字平台巨头百度、阿里巴巴和腾讯(BAT)为研究对象,手工搜集了2012—2021年BAT的146个并购案例,剖析了BAT并购的特征事实、动因与后果。首先,统计分析刻画了BAT并购的6大特征事实:(1)倾向于并购国内初创企业;(2)并购集中于主要收入部门;(3)终止被并购方产品的比例为41%;(4)并购趋势与其他科技公司相反;(5)倾向于通过跨行业并购进入新的领域;(6)并购行业重叠度逐年递增。其次,并购动因分析表明,对于BAT主要收入部门和平台成熟期实施的并购,被并购方产品被终止的概率较低,即已有证据不支持BAT的“杀手并购”动因。最后,并购后果分析表明,BAT并购促进了同行业企业进入数量和并购数量的增长,即未造成“杀伤区”。本文的研究为中国数字平台企业并购政策的构建提供了启示。In recent years,China's digital platform companies have experienced rapid growth,spurred by a supportive regulatory environment.However,the market has become highly concentrated,with leading platforms such as Baidu,Alibaba,and Tencent(collectively known as BAT)undertaking numerous acquisitions.This trend has sparked worries among regulators and the public,specifically“killer acquisitions”,where established companies acquire emerging competitors to eliminate future competition.This study aims to investigate the presence of such acquisitions among China's digital platform giants,analyze their motives,and assess the consequences,providing insights for antitrust policy formulation.The study has the following conclusions.First,this paper identifies six distinctive features of BAT's acquisition strategies:1.A strong preference for acquiring domestic startups;2.A concentration of acquisitions in their main revenue-generating sectors;3.A significant 41%of acquired companies'products are terminated post-acquisition.4.A divergence in acquisition trends compared to other technology companies.5.A strategic approach to cross-industry acquisitions aimed at entering new fields.6.An increasing overlap in the industries they target over time.Second,acquisitions occurring in BAT's primary revenue sectors and during their growth phases have a lower probability of resulting in product termination.This suggests that the primary motive behind these acquisitions is not to eliminate potential competition.Finally,BAT's acquisitions have led to an increase in both the number of new entrants and the volume of subsequent M&A activities within the same industry.This indicates BAT's acquisition activities have had a stimulating effect on market competition and have attracted more players to enter the industry.This paper makes several significant contributions.Firstly,this study fills a crucial gap in understanding the competitive strategies of digital platforms and their broader economic implications.Secondly,the study moves beyond theore

关 键 词：数字平台企业 杀手并购 并购动因 并购政策 

分 类 号：F49[经济管理—产业经济] F271