存款保险制度与银行效率:提升还是降低——来自风险偏好视角的经验证据  

Deposit Insurance System and Bank Efficiency:Increase or Decrease-Evidence from the Perspective of Risk Preference

在线阅读下载全文

作  者:丁宁[1] 吴晓 高婧 Ding Ning;Wu Xiao;Gao Jing

机构地区:[1]东北财经大学金融学院

出  处:《金融学季刊》2024年第1期96-120,共25页Quarterly Journal of Finance

基  金:辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目(L238BJY019);辽宁省教育厅基本科研项目(JYTMS20230637)的资助。

摘  要:存款保险制度深刻体现了党的二十大报告重点强调的“深化金融体制改革”和“守住不发生系统性风险底线”指导原则。本文基于2009~2020年中国商业银行数据,从风险偏好视角,透视存款保险制度与银行效率的关系。研究表明:综合考虑产出端收益和投入端成本,存款保险制度通过助推银行风险偏好降低其效率;动态效应分析揭示了两者的负向关系呈现“U型”特征,目前已越过“U型”谷底,结合银行异质性讨论和特征事实分析,发现信贷风险管理能力、资本充足水平和银行特许权价值的风险约束效应缓解了银行风险偏好,从而冲抵存款保险制度的负面影响。本文为在存款保险制度的背景下如何提升银行效率提供了一定参考。The deposit insurance system profoundly reflects the guiding principle of"deepening the reform of the financial system and safeguarding the bottom line of no systemic risk"as highlighted in the report of the 2Oth National Congress.Based on the data of Chinese commercial banks from 2009 to 2020,this paper studies the relationship between the deposit insurance system and bank efficiency from the perspective of risk preference.The result shows that,considering both output-side benefits and input-side costs,the deposit insurance system decreases banks'efficiency by boosting their risk preferences;the dynamic effect analysis reveals that the negative relationship between the two is"U-shaped"and has now crossed the bottom of the"U-shaped".Moreover,combined with the discussion of bank heterogeneity and the analysis of the facts,it is found that the risk-constrained effects of credit risk management capability,capital adequacy level and bank franchise value mitigate bank risk preference and thus offset the negative effects of the deposit insurance system.This paper provides some references on how to improve bank efficiency in the context of deposit insurance system.

关 键 词:存款保险制度 银行效率 风险偏好 产出端收益 投入端成本 

分 类 号:F842.6[经济管理—保险] F832.3

 

参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级参考文献:

正在载入数据...

 

耦合文献:

正在载入数据...

 

引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

二级引证文献:

正在载入数据...

 

同被引文献:

正在载入数据...

 

相关期刊文献:

正在载入数据...

相关的主题
相关的作者对象
相关的机构对象