接受一种逻辑,接受一种理论  

Accepting a Logic,Accepting a Theory

作　　者： 唐瑞雪(译) Timothy Williamson

机构地区：[1]牛津大学哲学系,英国牛津OX13BN [2]武汉大学哲学学院

出　　处：《社会科学战线》2024年第11期1-15,281,共16页Social Science Front

摘　　要：文章回应了索尔·克里普克对采用择代逻辑想法的批评,捍卫一种反逻辑例外论。根据这种观点,接受一种新逻辑是接受一种新科学理论的特殊情况。关于量化模态逻辑的争论详细地说明了这一观点。民间逻辑与科学逻辑的区分以民间物理学与科学物理学的区分为模型。在应用这种区分时,注意不要混淆逻辑与元逻辑。可废止的推论倾向在逻辑学和数学以及自然科学和社会科学的理论接受中发挥着重要作用。与信念一样,这种倾向会随着证据的变化而变化,尽管不是随心所欲的。考虑蒯因的反对意见,即认为接受一种择代逻辑涉及改变主题,而不是否定学说,该反对意见被证明依赖于对确定意义的社会维度的忽视,类似于克里普克和普特南所批评的关于专名和自然种类词的描述主义。通常的解释标准表明,经典逻辑学家与非经典逻辑学家之间的争论是真正的分歧。This paper responds to Saul Kripke's critique of the idea of adopting an Alternative logic.It defends an anti-exceptionalist view of logic,on which coming to accept a new logic is a special case of coming to accept a new scientific theory.The approach is illustrated in detail by debates on quantified modal logic.A distinction between folk logic and scientific logic is modelled on the distinction between folk physics and scientific physics.The importance of not confusing logic with metalogic in applying this distinction is emphasized.Defeasible inferential dispositions are shown to play a major role in theory acceptance in logic and mathematics as well as in natural and social science.Like beliefs,such dispositions are malleable in response to evidence,though not simply at will.Consideration is given to the Quinean objection that accepting an alternative logic involves changing the subject rather than denying the doctrine.The objection is shown to depend on neglect of the social dimension of meaning determination,akin to the descriptivism about proper names and natural kind terms criticized by Kripke and Putnam.Normal standards of interpretation indicate that disputes between classical and non-classical logicians are genuine disagreements.

关 键 词：模态逻辑 直觉主义逻辑 择代逻辑 克里普克 蒯因 达米特 普特南 

分 类 号：B81[哲学宗教—逻辑学]