超级平台“掐尖式并购”:并购路径、规制逻辑与因应对策  

Super Platform Merger and Acquisition of Start-Up Enterprises:Merger and Acquisition Path,Regulation Logic and Countermeasures

作　　者：汪莉 王晨 

机构地区：[1]上海大学法学院

出　　处：《竞争政策研究》2024年第5期25-37,共13页Competition Policy Research

摘　　要：数字经济具有网络效应、零价竞争、多边市场等诸多特征,在提升交易效率的同时,也诱发了掐尖式并购的泛滥。超级平台掐尖式并购后的行为效果包括在并购后通过优势业务“引流”抢占市场份额和彻底消灭潜在竞争对手两种效果。超级平台掐尖并购可能会消灭初创企业的竞争威胁,催化市场力量跨界传导及整合产品和服务扼杀创新,危害尤巨。然而,现行营业额申报标准和经营者集中实质审查规则无法有效因应平台特点,并购竞争损害救济存在制度阻碍。同时反垄断控制与平台监管亦存在协调性不足的问题。基于此,当前应构建未达申报标准的经营者集中审查规则,建立包括市场估值、用户数量、技术创新程度的多元可识别标准,在竞争评估中需要考虑超级平台生态系统的广泛影响和竞争的非价格参数。同时完善超级平台掐尖式并购的竞争损害救济及形塑超级平台掐尖式并购的回应型监管机制。Digital economy has many characteristics such as network effects,zero-price competition,multilateral market and so on.While improving the transaction efficiency,it also induces the super platform to merge and acquire start-ups.The behavioral effects of merger and acquisition of start-ups through super platforms include the two effects,seizing market share through advantageous business and eliminating potential competitors completely.Merger and acquisition through super platforms may eliminate the competitive threat of start-ups,catalyze the transmission of market power across boundaries and integrate products and services,and stifle innovation,which is particularly harmful.However,the existing rules on the review of the concentration of undertakings cannot properly respond to the characteristics of such platforms.At the same time,there is also a problem of insufficient coordination between anti-monopoly control and platform regulation.Based on this,we should formulate rules to review the concentration of undertakings that fall short of the notification threshold,perfect the remedy for competition damage caused by the merger and acquisition through super platforms and develop responsive regulation for the merger and acquisition through super platforms.

关 键 词：数字平台 掐尖式并购 申报标准 救济机制 

分 类 号：D922.294[政治法律—经济法学]